City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
Concepcion, J.:
Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.
Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.
In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition…and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned…" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."
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Wednesday, December 17, 2008
Manlangit vs. Urgel
REYNATO MANLANGIT vs.JUDGE MELITO L. URGEL
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1028 December 4, 1995
Administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law.
Paras, J.:
Facts: On August 13, 1994, the jeepney owned by complainant and driven by Edgardo Castillo, plied its usual route going to Virac, Catanduanes. While approaching a blind curve, the jeepney driver occupied the wrong lane. At the curve, they suddenly saw a parked dump truck and in order to avoid collision driver swerved to the right and accidentally plunged into the river. The passengers sustained some injuries.
Consequently, a criminal complaint against Castillo and complainant was filed before the sala of respondent judge who then issued a warrant for the arrest of both Castillo and complainant.
Issue: WON complainant can be held criminally liable.
Ruling: It has been held in Chapman v. Underwood (G.R. No. 9010, March 28, 1914, 27 Phil 374.) "that An owner who sits in his automobile and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either criminally or civilly, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's acts his own."
In the case at bar, nowhere does it show that complainant participated in abetted or even approved the negligent and reckless manner in which his driver maneuvered the vehicle on that blind curve. Hence, the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge was erroneous.
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A.M. No. MTJ-95-1028 December 4, 1995
Administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law.
Paras, J.:
Facts: On August 13, 1994, the jeepney owned by complainant and driven by Edgardo Castillo, plied its usual route going to Virac, Catanduanes. While approaching a blind curve, the jeepney driver occupied the wrong lane. At the curve, they suddenly saw a parked dump truck and in order to avoid collision driver swerved to the right and accidentally plunged into the river. The passengers sustained some injuries.
Consequently, a criminal complaint against Castillo and complainant was filed before the sala of respondent judge who then issued a warrant for the arrest of both Castillo and complainant.
Issue: WON complainant can be held criminally liable.
Ruling: It has been held in Chapman v. Underwood (G.R. No. 9010, March 28, 1914, 27 Phil 374.) "that An owner who sits in his automobile and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either criminally or civilly, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's acts his own."
In the case at bar, nowhere does it show that complainant participated in abetted or even approved the negligent and reckless manner in which his driver maneuvered the vehicle on that blind curve. Hence, the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge was erroneous.
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Monday, December 15, 2008
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA
FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.
RULING: Petition granted.
RATIO: Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the holding of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
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FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against the school.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.
RULING: Petition granted.
RATIO: Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of the picnic does not in any way consent to the holding of the same.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
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CARTICIANO VS. NUVAL
CARTICIANO VS. NUVAL
FACTS: Plaintiff Zacarias Carticiano was on his way home to Imus, Cavite. He was driving his father’s Ford Laser car. On the same date and time, defendant Nuval’s owner-type Jeep, then driven by defendant Darwin was traveling on the opposite direction going to Parañaque. When the two cars were about to pass one another, Darwin veered his vehicle to his left going to the center island of the highway an occupied the lane which plaintiff Zacarias was traversing. Zacarias’ Ford Laser collided head-on with Nuval’s Jeep. Darwin immediately fled from the scene. Zacarias suffered multiple fracture. He underwent a leg operation and physical therapy. Nuval offered P100,000.00 as compensation for the injuries caused. Plaintiffs refused to accept it. Plaintiffs filed a criminal suit against Darwin and a civil suit against defendants for damages. Trial court ruled infavor of plaintiffs. CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: W/N employer Nuval can be held liable.
RULING: Petition granted.
RATIO: Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The facts established in the case at bar show that Darwin was acting within the scope of the authority given him when the collision occurred. That he had been hired only to bring respondent’s children to and from school must be rejected. True, this may have been one of his assigned tasks, but no convincing proof was presented showing that it was his only task. His authority was to drive Nuval’s vehicle. Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law presumes the vehicle owner equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving proper selection of employee as a defense. Respondent failed to show that he had satisfactorily discharged this burden.
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FACTS: Plaintiff Zacarias Carticiano was on his way home to Imus, Cavite. He was driving his father’s Ford Laser car. On the same date and time, defendant Nuval’s owner-type Jeep, then driven by defendant Darwin was traveling on the opposite direction going to Parañaque. When the two cars were about to pass one another, Darwin veered his vehicle to his left going to the center island of the highway an occupied the lane which plaintiff Zacarias was traversing. Zacarias’ Ford Laser collided head-on with Nuval’s Jeep. Darwin immediately fled from the scene. Zacarias suffered multiple fracture. He underwent a leg operation and physical therapy. Nuval offered P100,000.00 as compensation for the injuries caused. Plaintiffs refused to accept it. Plaintiffs filed a criminal suit against Darwin and a civil suit against defendants for damages. Trial court ruled infavor of plaintiffs. CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: W/N employer Nuval can be held liable.
RULING: Petition granted.
RATIO: Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The facts established in the case at bar show that Darwin was acting within the scope of the authority given him when the collision occurred. That he had been hired only to bring respondent’s children to and from school must be rejected. True, this may have been one of his assigned tasks, but no convincing proof was presented showing that it was his only task. His authority was to drive Nuval’s vehicle. Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law presumes the vehicle owner equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving proper selection of employee as a defense. Respondent failed to show that he had satisfactorily discharged this burden.
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Saturday, December 13, 2008
Farrales vs. City Mayor of Baguio, et. al.
LEONOR FARRALES, assisted by her husband, EMILIO FARRALES vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO, THE CHIEF OF POLICE, THE MARKET SUPERINTENDENT AND THE CITY TREASURER
G.R. No. L-24245. 11 April 1972.
Appeal from the decision of the CFI Baguio
Makalintal, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct a permanent building, Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the permanent building was completed. Instead, Plaintiff built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market without seeking prior permit from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish the shack, Plaintiff sought an injunction before the CFI which asked her that she present proper permit. Upon failure of petitioner to comply with the order, the CFI denied the petition for injunction, and the police then demolished the shack.
ISSUES: (1) WON the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance; (2) WON the police officers are liable for damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance.
RULING: Judgment Affirmed.
(1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to put up the temporary stall in question in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its location on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was such that it constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people.
(2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in only two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary injury; or (b) if an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
In the case at bar, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but through a judicial proceeding. The denial of petitioner’s petition for injunction was in effect an authority for the police to carry out the act which was sought to be enjoined.
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G.R. No. L-24245. 11 April 1972.
Appeal from the decision of the CFI Baguio
Makalintal, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct a permanent building, Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the permanent building was completed. Instead, Plaintiff built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market without seeking prior permit from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish the shack, Plaintiff sought an injunction before the CFI which asked her that she present proper permit. Upon failure of petitioner to comply with the order, the CFI denied the petition for injunction, and the police then demolished the shack.
ISSUES: (1) WON the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance; (2) WON the police officers are liable for damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance.
RULING: Judgment Affirmed.
(1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to put up the temporary stall in question in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its location on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was such that it constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people.
(2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in only two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary injury; or (b) if an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
In the case at bar, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but through a judicial proceeding. The denial of petitioner’s petition for injunction was in effect an authority for the police to carry out the act which was sought to be enjoined.
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COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks “are adulterated.” As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.
RULING: Petition Denied.
The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach of warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."
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G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks “are adulterated.” As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.
RULING: Petition Denied.
The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach of warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."
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Monday, December 8, 2008
GABETO VS. ARANETA
GABETO VS. ARANETA
FACTS: In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the bridle. Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other, Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.
ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of the horse by Araneta.
RULING: Judgement reversed and defendant absolved from the complaint.
RATIO: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.
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FACTS: In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the bridle. Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other, Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.
ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of the horse by Araneta.
RULING: Judgement reversed and defendant absolved from the complaint.
RATIO: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.
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TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ
TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ
FACTS: The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The Court of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. CA reversed.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is liable.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: Petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building where the petitioner's vocational school was housed. The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury.
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FACTS: The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The Court of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. CA reversed.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is liable.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: Petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building where the petitioner's vocational school was housed. The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury.
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Sunday, December 7, 2008
Salen vs. Balce
SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA vs. JOSE BALCE
G.R. No. L-14414. 27 April 1960.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines Norte.
Bautista Angelo, J.:
Facts: Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then single, 18 yrs old and was living with defendant. As a result of C. Salen's death, G. Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before CFI to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest. Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases. CFI sustained the theory of defendant.
Issue: WON appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with Art. 2180 of the CC.
Ruling: Judgment reversed.
Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the RPC (art.101) is subserved by this particular provision of our CC, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of the SC which cover equal or identical cases.
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G.R. No. L-14414. 27 April 1960.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines Norte.
Bautista Angelo, J.:
Facts: Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then single, 18 yrs old and was living with defendant. As a result of C. Salen's death, G. Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before CFI to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest. Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases. CFI sustained the theory of defendant.
Issue: WON appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with Art. 2180 of the CC.
Ruling: Judgment reversed.
Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the RPC (art.101) is subserved by this particular provision of our CC, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of the SC which cover equal or identical cases.
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Umali vs. Bacani
TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570. 30 January 1976.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan.
Esguerra, J.:
Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.
(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
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Bernardo vs. Legaspi
Bernardo vs. Legaspi
Facts: Plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a collission of plaintiff's automobile and that of the defendant. Defendant filed a cross-complaint against the plaintiff claiming that the collission was due to plaintiff's negligence. The trial court found both drivers negligence.
Issue: WON the plaintiff is negligent in handling his automobile.
Ruling: Complaint Dismissed.
Ratio: Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for the damages suffered.
*Dre
Facts: Plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a collission of plaintiff's automobile and that of the defendant. Defendant filed a cross-complaint against the plaintiff claiming that the collission was due to plaintiff's negligence. The trial court found both drivers negligence.
Issue: WON the plaintiff is negligent in handling his automobile.
Ruling: Complaint Dismissed.
Ratio: Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for the damages suffered.
*Dre
Paleyan vs. Bangkili
Paleyan vs. Bangkili
Facts: Carlos Bangkili, 19 yrs. of age killed Balos Paleyan. As a result of the death of Balos Paleyan and of the wounding of another victim, Bangkili was accused of the crime of homocide with less serious physical injuries. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly, but no desicion as to the civil indemnity which should be paid to the heirs of the deceased was made. Plaintiffs filed an action for damages against Carlos Bangkili and his mother, Victoria Bangkili. Complaint was dismissed against Victoria because his son was already 19 yrs. of age at the time he committed the offense. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the mother of Carlos should be liable with him for the amount which he was sentenced to pay considering that he was then a minor of 19 yrs.
Ruling: Victoria Bangkili is liable solidarily with her son.
Ratio: Art. 2180 is aplicable in this case. Considering that her son, although living with her, was already 19 yrs. of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal defense, however, and does not exempt the appellent from her responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Art. 2180 does not provide for any exemption except proof that the defendant parent "observed all the diligence of a god father of a family to prevent damage."
*Dre
Facts: Carlos Bangkili, 19 yrs. of age killed Balos Paleyan. As a result of the death of Balos Paleyan and of the wounding of another victim, Bangkili was accused of the crime of homocide with less serious physical injuries. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly, but no desicion as to the civil indemnity which should be paid to the heirs of the deceased was made. Plaintiffs filed an action for damages against Carlos Bangkili and his mother, Victoria Bangkili. Complaint was dismissed against Victoria because his son was already 19 yrs. of age at the time he committed the offense. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the mother of Carlos should be liable with him for the amount which he was sentenced to pay considering that he was then a minor of 19 yrs.
Ruling: Victoria Bangkili is liable solidarily with her son.
Ratio: Art. 2180 is aplicable in this case. Considering that her son, although living with her, was already 19 yrs. of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal defense, however, and does not exempt the appellent from her responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Art. 2180 does not provide for any exemption except proof that the defendant parent "observed all the diligence of a god father of a family to prevent damage."
*Dre
Monday, December 1, 2008
La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. vs. De Jesus, Tolentino and CA
LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21486. 14 May 1966.
Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA which affirmed that rendered by the CFI Bulacan
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Facts: The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on which she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded. The court a quo sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, to pay to plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and moral damages; and counsel fees. CA affirmed.
Issues: (1) WON the petitioners are liable for the consequences of the accident. (2) WON petitioners are liable for moral damages.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for negligence. Both the CFI and the CA found that the bus was running quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new, petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out, the plea of caso fortuito by petitioner cannot be entertained. The cause of the blow-out was a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough check-up before it took to the road. Hence, petitioners are liable for the accident.
(2) The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
*Dani'q
G.R. No. L-21486. 14 May 1966.
Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA which affirmed that rendered by the CFI Bulacan
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Facts: The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on which she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded. The court a quo sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, to pay to plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and moral damages; and counsel fees. CA affirmed.
Issues: (1) WON the petitioners are liable for the consequences of the accident. (2) WON petitioners are liable for moral damages.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for negligence. Both the CFI and the CA found that the bus was running quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new, petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out, the plea of caso fortuito by petitioner cannot be entertained. The cause of the blow-out was a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough check-up before it took to the road. Hence, petitioners are liable for the accident.
(2) The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
*Dani'q
Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.
Teodora Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.
G.R. No. L-33380. 17 December 1930.
Malcolm, J.:
Facts: In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the defendant, Manila Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue: WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render it liable for damages.
Ruling: The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
In the case at ber, the cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.
*Dani'q
G.R. No. L-33380. 17 December 1930.
Malcolm, J.:
Facts: In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the defendant, Manila Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue: WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render it liable for damages.
Ruling: The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
In the case at ber, the cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.
*Dani'q
Gregorio, et. al. vs. Go Chong Bing
Honoria Vda. de Gregorio, et. al. vs, Go Chong Bing
No. L-7763. 2 December 1957
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI Davao
Labrador, J.:
Facts: Defendant, owner of trucks, had a driver and a "cargador" by the name of Francisco Romera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952, defendant ordered Romera to drive his tuck with instructions that he follow another truck which was to be driven by the defendant's driver. On its way, some persons boarded the truck, one of them was a uniformed polceman by the name of Venana Orfanel. After a while, Orfanel asked and insisted on driving the truck. Romera, out of respect and belief that Orfanel knew how to drive well, allowed Orfanel to take the wheel. While Orfanel was driving, they came to a truck that was about to park on the left side of the road. To avoid collision, Orfanel swerved to the right and hit two pedestrians and ran over one of them named Quirico Gregorio. Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. The heirs of Gregorio brought present case for damages against the defendant, owner of the truck that ran over Gregorio. The CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the death of Gregorio was caused by a negligent act/omission of a person that is not, in any way, related to the defendant.
Issue: WON defendant may be held liable for damages.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
Where the death/accident is brought by an act/omission of a person who is not, in any way, related to the defendant, and the said act is the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of the victim, or accident which is punishable by law, defendant should be absolved from any civil liability.
The reason is not because the one responsible for the accident had already indemnified the victim but because there is no direct, causal connection between the negligence/violation of law by the defendant to the death of the victim.
*Dan'q
No. L-7763. 2 December 1957
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI Davao
Labrador, J.:
Facts: Defendant, owner of trucks, had a driver and a "cargador" by the name of Francisco Romera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952, defendant ordered Romera to drive his tuck with instructions that he follow another truck which was to be driven by the defendant's driver. On its way, some persons boarded the truck, one of them was a uniformed polceman by the name of Venana Orfanel. After a while, Orfanel asked and insisted on driving the truck. Romera, out of respect and belief that Orfanel knew how to drive well, allowed Orfanel to take the wheel. While Orfanel was driving, they came to a truck that was about to park on the left side of the road. To avoid collision, Orfanel swerved to the right and hit two pedestrians and ran over one of them named Quirico Gregorio. Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. The heirs of Gregorio brought present case for damages against the defendant, owner of the truck that ran over Gregorio. The CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the death of Gregorio was caused by a negligent act/omission of a person that is not, in any way, related to the defendant.
Issue: WON defendant may be held liable for damages.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
Where the death/accident is brought by an act/omission of a person who is not, in any way, related to the defendant, and the said act is the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of the victim, or accident which is punishable by law, defendant should be absolved from any civil liability.
The reason is not because the one responsible for the accident had already indemnified the victim but because there is no direct, causal connection between the negligence/violation of law by the defendant to the death of the victim.
*Dan'q
Sunday, November 30, 2008
Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District
MR. & MRS. ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT (gov’t-owned corp.)
No. L-7664. 29 August 1958.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Rizal QC
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.
Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and towing line. Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool use. In that, it appears that defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury to or even death of its patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has went to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause of his death.
*Dani'q
No. L-7664. 29 August 1958.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Rizal QC
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.
Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and towing line. Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool use. In that, it appears that defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury to or even death of its patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has went to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause of his death.
*Dani'q
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.
Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occassion.
*Dre
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.
Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occassion.
*Dre
CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.
CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.
Facts: Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s siren. Plaintiff´s husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband.
Issue: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.
Ruling: Complaint Dismissed
Ratio: ¨ A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the apperance of a train, is guilty of crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results.¨ The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was not allowed to recover.
*Dre
Facts: Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s siren. Plaintiff´s husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband.
Issue: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.
Ruling: Complaint Dismissed
Ratio: ¨ A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the apperance of a train, is guilty of crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results.¨ The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was not allowed to recover.
*Dre
Wednesday, November 26, 2008
LBC Air Cargo, Inc., et. al. vs. CA
LBC Air Cargo, Inc., et. al. vs. CA
G.R. No. 101683. 23 February 1995.
Petition for review of a decision of the CA reversing that of the RTC and holding LBC and Tano liable.
Vitug, J.:
Facts: At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its way to Bislig Airport. When Tano was approaching the airport entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting Tano started to make a sharp left turn and when he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the LBC van. Monterola died.
Issue:WON the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause of the accident.
Ruling: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner Tano, who, despite poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for the dust to settle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant case, the victim was travelling along the lane where he was rightl supposd to be. The incident occured in an instant. No apreciable time had elapsed that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. However, the deceased was contributorily negligent in evidently speeding.
The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory negligence on the victim's part that warrants a mitigation of petitioner's liability for damages.
*Dan'q
G.R. No. 101683. 23 February 1995.
Petition for review of a decision of the CA reversing that of the RTC and holding LBC and Tano liable.
Vitug, J.:
Facts: At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its way to Bislig Airport. When Tano was approaching the airport entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting Tano started to make a sharp left turn and when he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the LBC van. Monterola died.
Issue:WON the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause of the accident.
Ruling: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner Tano, who, despite poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for the dust to settle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant case, the victim was travelling along the lane where he was rightl supposd to be. The incident occured in an instant. No apreciable time had elapsed that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. However, the deceased was contributorily negligent in evidently speeding.
The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory negligence on the victim's part that warrants a mitigation of petitioner's liability for damages.
*Dan'q
PLDT vs. CA
Facts: On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban had their jeep ran over a sand of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of warning light or signs. Respondent spouses suffered physical injuries and their jeeps windshield was shattered. PLDT alleged that the respondents were negligent and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Company which undertook said conduit system to be the one liable.The latter claimed to have complied with its contract and had installed necessary barricades.
Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
Ruling: Private Respondent´s negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident, hence he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT considering that he had ¨the last clear chance¨, to avoid the injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
*Dre
Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
Ruling: Private Respondent´s negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident, hence he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT considering that he had ¨the last clear chance¨, to avoid the injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
*Dre
NAPOCOR vs. CA
Facts: On Nov. 4, 1967, a typhoon called ¨Welming¨ hit Central Luzon passing through NAPOCOR´s Angat Hydro-Electric Project Dam in Bulacan. The water level had reach the danger height of 212 meters above sea level and abruptly opened the spillway gates. This action by NAPOCOR had an extraordinary large volume of water rushed and hit the installations and construction works of ECI (Engineering Construction, Inc.) a contractor of NAWASA for its tunnel in Bulacan. The negligent manner of opening the spillway gates by NAPOCOR had washed away, lost or destroyed ECI´s facilities and structures. NAPOCOR alleged that the destruction and loss was due to force majeure.
Issue: WON NAPOCOR is liable for the destruction.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed
Ratio: NAPOCOR cannot escape liability because it´s negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage even though the typhoon was an act of God. It was undoubtly negligent when it only opened the spillway gates at the height of typhoon ¨Welming¨ when it knew very well that it was safer to open it gradually. To be exempt from liability, NAPOCOR must be free from any previous negligence.
*DreSaturday, November 22, 2008
Singson and Del Castillo vs. BPI and Freixas
JULIAN SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS (Pres. Of BPI)
G.R. No. L-24837. 29 June 1968.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Facts: Appeal by plaintiffs from a decision of the CFI Mla dismissing their complaint against defendants.
On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its president, Freixas, for damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.
After appropriate proceedings, the CFI Mla rendered judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature.
Issue: WON the existence of a contractual relation between the parties bar recovery of damages.
Ruling: The judgment appealed from is reversed holding defendant BPI to pay to the plaintiffs nominal damages, and attorney's fees, apart from the costs.
The SC have repeatedly held that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore.
In view, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake they had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the amount of which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.
*Dani'q
G.R. No. L-24837. 29 June 1968.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Facts: Appeal by plaintiffs from a decision of the CFI Mla dismissing their complaint against defendants.
On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its president, Freixas, for damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.
After appropriate proceedings, the CFI Mla rendered judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature.
Issue: WON the existence of a contractual relation between the parties bar recovery of damages.
Ruling: The judgment appealed from is reversed holding defendant BPI to pay to the plaintiffs nominal damages, and attorney's fees, apart from the costs.
The SC have repeatedly held that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore.
In view, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake they had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the amount of which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.
*Dani'q
People vs Ligon
People vs Ligon
Facts: An appeal from te judgment of the RTC convicting accused of the crime of robbery with homicide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales, a 17-year-old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box, and the latter uon clinging to the window of the accused, lost his grip and fell down the pavement as the car sped up. On appeal. The Cort held that it was not convinced with moral certainty of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, hence he was acquitted.
Issue: WON a person feed from criminal liability is also freed from civil liability
Ruling: Accused acquitted but held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault and negligence.
Ratio: It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution, only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action.
On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witness at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, We find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done.
*Mia
Facts: An appeal from te judgment of the RTC convicting accused of the crime of robbery with homicide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales, a 17-year-old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box, and the latter uon clinging to the window of the accused, lost his grip and fell down the pavement as the car sped up. On appeal. The Cort held that it was not convinced with moral certainty of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, hence he was acquitted.
Issue: WON a person feed from criminal liability is also freed from civil liability
Ruling: Accused acquitted but held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault and negligence.
Ratio: It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution, only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action.
On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witness at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, We find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done.
*Mia
Imson vs. Ca
IMSON Vs. CA
Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision involving petitioner's Tuyota Corolla and a hino diesel truck registered under the names of private respondents, FNCB Finance Corp, and Holiday Hills stock and Breeding Farm Corp. The collision seriously injured petitioner and totally wrecked hs car. A complaint for damages was instituted against the registered owners of the truck, the truck driver, the beneficial owners of the truck and the truck insurer, Western Guaranty Corp.In 1987, petitioner and insurer entered into a compromise agreement, hence the complaint was dismissed against the insurer. Later, private respondents moved to dismiss the case against all defendants contending that since they are all indispensable parties, the dismissal of the case against the insurer must result in the dismissal of the suit against all of them.
Issue: WON all of the defendants were indispensable parties.
Ruling: Petition granted.
Ratio: It is true that all of the petitioners' claims are premised on the wrong committed by the defendant truck driver. Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable party to the suit. The other defendants cannot be as indispensable parties, they are merely proper parties to the case.
Thus, if petitioners did not sue Western Guaranty Corp, the omission would not cause the dismissal of the suit against the other defendants. Even without the insurer, the trial court would not lose its competency to act completely and validly on the damage suit.
*Mia
Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision involving petitioner's Tuyota Corolla and a hino diesel truck registered under the names of private respondents, FNCB Finance Corp, and Holiday Hills stock and Breeding Farm Corp. The collision seriously injured petitioner and totally wrecked hs car. A complaint for damages was instituted against the registered owners of the truck, the truck driver, the beneficial owners of the truck and the truck insurer, Western Guaranty Corp.In 1987, petitioner and insurer entered into a compromise agreement, hence the complaint was dismissed against the insurer. Later, private respondents moved to dismiss the case against all defendants contending that since they are all indispensable parties, the dismissal of the case against the insurer must result in the dismissal of the suit against all of them.
Issue: WON all of the defendants were indispensable parties.
Ruling: Petition granted.
Ratio: It is true that all of the petitioners' claims are premised on the wrong committed by the defendant truck driver. Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable party to the suit. The other defendants cannot be as indispensable parties, they are merely proper parties to the case.
Thus, if petitioners did not sue Western Guaranty Corp, the omission would not cause the dismissal of the suit against the other defendants. Even without the insurer, the trial court would not lose its competency to act completely and validly on the damage suit.
*Mia
Saturday, November 15, 2008
RODZSSEN SUPPLY CO. INC. vs. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO.
RODZSSEN SUPPLY CO. INC. vs. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 109087. 9 May 2001.
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:
Facts: Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January 21, 1993 Decision2 of the CA which affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On January 15, 1979, defendant Rodzssen Supply, Inc. opened with plaintiff Far East Bank and Trust Co. a 30-day domestic letter of credit, in the amount of P190,000.00 in favor of Ekman and Company, Inc. (Ekman) for the purchase from the latter of five units of hydraulic loaders, to expire on February 15, 1979. The three loaders were delivered to defendant for which plaintiff paid Ekman and which defendant paid plaintiff before expiry date of LC. The remaining two loaders were delivered to defendant but the latter refused to pay. Ekman pressed payment to plaintiff. Plaintiff paid Ekman for the two loaders and later demanded from defendant such amount as it paid Ekman. Defendant refused payment contending that there was a breach of contract by plaintiff who in bad faith paid Ekman, knowing that the two units of hydraulic loaders had been delivered to defendant after the expiry date of subject LC.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable to respondent.
Ruling: The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner should pay respondent bank the amount the latter expended for the equipment belatedly delivered by Ekman and voluntarily received and kept by petitioner. Equitable considerations behoove us to allow recovery by respondent. True, it erred in paying Ekman, but petitioner itself was not without fault in the transaction. It must be noted that the latter had voluntarily received and kept the loaders since October 1979. When both parties to a transaction are mutually negligent in the performance of their obligations, the fault of one cancels the negligence of the other and, as in this case, their rights and obligations may be determined equitably under the law proscribing unjust enrichment.
*Daniq*
G.R. No. 109087. 9 May 2001.
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:
Facts: Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January 21, 1993 Decision2 of the CA which affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On January 15, 1979, defendant Rodzssen Supply, Inc. opened with plaintiff Far East Bank and Trust Co. a 30-day domestic letter of credit, in the amount of P190,000.00 in favor of Ekman and Company, Inc. (Ekman) for the purchase from the latter of five units of hydraulic loaders, to expire on February 15, 1979. The three loaders were delivered to defendant for which plaintiff paid Ekman and which defendant paid plaintiff before expiry date of LC. The remaining two loaders were delivered to defendant but the latter refused to pay. Ekman pressed payment to plaintiff. Plaintiff paid Ekman for the two loaders and later demanded from defendant such amount as it paid Ekman. Defendant refused payment contending that there was a breach of contract by plaintiff who in bad faith paid Ekman, knowing that the two units of hydraulic loaders had been delivered to defendant after the expiry date of subject LC.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable to respondent.
Ruling: The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner should pay respondent bank the amount the latter expended for the equipment belatedly delivered by Ekman and voluntarily received and kept by petitioner. Equitable considerations behoove us to allow recovery by respondent. True, it erred in paying Ekman, but petitioner itself was not without fault in the transaction. It must be noted that the latter had voluntarily received and kept the loaders since October 1979. When both parties to a transaction are mutually negligent in the performance of their obligations, the fault of one cancels the negligence of the other and, as in this case, their rights and obligations may be determined equitably under the law proscribing unjust enrichment.
*Daniq*
Friday, November 14, 2008
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY CORPORATION
G.R. No.119771. 24 Apr 1998.
FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)
ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.
RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.
*Jen*
G.R. No.119771. 24 Apr 1998.
FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)
ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.
RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.
*Jen*
RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. and RIDJO PAPER CORP vs. CA et al
RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. and RIDJO PAPER CORP vs. CA et al
GR No 126074. 24 Feb 1998.
Ponente: Romero, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the CA which reversed that of the RTC of Quezon City, ordering petitioners to pay private respondent Manila Electric Co. (MERALCO) the amount of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 plus the costs of suit.
On September 4, 1991 and on July 30, 1992, petitioners received a letter from MERALCO demanding payment of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 , respectively, allegedly representing unregistered electric consumption for the period November 7, 1990, to February 13, 1991 and for the period July 15, 1991 to April 13, 1992. MERALCO justified its demand on the ground that the unregistered electric consumption was due to the defects of the electric meter located in the premises of petitioners. Since petitioners refused to pay the amount, MERALCO notified them that their electricity be disconnected.
ISSUE: WON petitioners should pay the amounts demanded by Meralco despite the defective meter installed by the latter.
RULING: Decision MODIFIED. Petitioners are ordered to pay MERALCO the amount P168,342.75, representing its average electric consumption three months prior to the period in controversy.
It must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence.
The SC concludes that this is a case of negligence on the part of MERALCO for which it must bear the consequences. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute between the parties.
MERALCO, being a public utility vested with vital public interest, is impressed with certain obligations towards its customers and any omission on its part would be prejudicial to its interest. For in the final analysis, the bottom line is that those who do not exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear the consequences of such oversight.
*Daniq*
GR No 126074. 24 Feb 1998.
Ponente: Romero, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the CA which reversed that of the RTC of Quezon City, ordering petitioners to pay private respondent Manila Electric Co. (MERALCO) the amount of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 plus the costs of suit.
On September 4, 1991 and on July 30, 1992, petitioners received a letter from MERALCO demanding payment of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 , respectively, allegedly representing unregistered electric consumption for the period November 7, 1990, to February 13, 1991 and for the period July 15, 1991 to April 13, 1992. MERALCO justified its demand on the ground that the unregistered electric consumption was due to the defects of the electric meter located in the premises of petitioners. Since petitioners refused to pay the amount, MERALCO notified them that their electricity be disconnected.
ISSUE: WON petitioners should pay the amounts demanded by Meralco despite the defective meter installed by the latter.
RULING: Decision MODIFIED. Petitioners are ordered to pay MERALCO the amount P168,342.75, representing its average electric consumption three months prior to the period in controversy.
It must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence.
The SC concludes that this is a case of negligence on the part of MERALCO for which it must bear the consequences. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute between the parties.
MERALCO, being a public utility vested with vital public interest, is impressed with certain obligations towards its customers and any omission on its part would be prejudicial to its interest. For in the final analysis, the bottom line is that those who do not exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear the consequences of such oversight.
*Daniq*
Thursday, November 13, 2008
Espero Salao vs. CA and Jowie Apolonio
Espero Salao vs. CA and Jowie Apolonio G.R. No. 107725. 22 January 1998.
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Facts: This case, which was originated from a complaint for damages filed by private respondent for head injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the petitioner, is a petittion for review on certioraroi of the decision of the CA affirming RTC's decisionwhich ordered petitioner to pay private respondent actual damages, moral damages and atty's fees, as well as the appellate court's resolution denying petitioner's MR.
Petitioner questions the award of damages and atty's fees, providing, as additional ground, the fact that in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats based on the same incident, the MTC found him 'not guilty' and accordingly dismissed the case against him.
Issue: WON the award of damages and atty's fees are appropriate.
Ruling: Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Being a case of physical injuries resulting from a crime or quasi-delict, moral damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court [Art. 2219 (1)(2) NCC].
Additionally, the civil liability for quasi-delict, which is allowed to be brought "separately and independently" of the criminal action by art. 33 NCC, is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not been committed by the accused since it is entirely possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil action may not have been presented in the criminal action with the result that the accused in the latter case may be acquitted.
*Peewee*
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Facts: This case, which was originated from a complaint for damages filed by private respondent for head injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the petitioner, is a petittion for review on certioraroi of the decision of the CA affirming RTC's decisionwhich ordered petitioner to pay private respondent actual damages, moral damages and atty's fees, as well as the appellate court's resolution denying petitioner's MR.
Petitioner questions the award of damages and atty's fees, providing, as additional ground, the fact that in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats based on the same incident, the MTC found him 'not guilty' and accordingly dismissed the case against him.
Issue: WON the award of damages and atty's fees are appropriate.
Ruling: Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Being a case of physical injuries resulting from a crime or quasi-delict, moral damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court [Art. 2219 (1)(2) NCC].
Additionally, the civil liability for quasi-delict, which is allowed to be brought "separately and independently" of the criminal action by art. 33 NCC, is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not been committed by the accused since it is entirely possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil action may not have been presented in the criminal action with the result that the accused in the latter case may be acquitted.
*Peewee*
Gan vs CA
Hedy Gan y Yu vs CA
No. L-44264. 19 Sept 1988.
Ponente: Fernan, C.J.:
Facts: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles parked on one side of the road, one following the other. As the car driven by Gan approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit an old man who was about to cross the street, pinning him against the rear of one of the parked vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the other parked vehicle in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.
Issue: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple imprudence.
Ruling: SC reversed CA's decision, acquitting petitioner.
Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence resulting in Homicide.
*Daniq*
No. L-44264. 19 Sept 1988.
Ponente: Fernan, C.J.:
Facts: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles parked on one side of the road, one following the other. As the car driven by Gan approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit an old man who was about to cross the street, pinning him against the rear of one of the parked vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the other parked vehicle in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.
Issue: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple imprudence.
Ruling: SC reversed CA's decision, acquitting petitioner.
Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence resulting in Homicide.
*Daniq*
Thermochem Inc. vs. Naval
Thermochem Inc. vs. Naval. Gr. No.131541. 20 Oct 2000
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago
Facts: On May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem was driving a "Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig, going towards Cainta. Prior to the collision, the taxicab was parked along the right side of Ortigas Avenue, not far from the Rosario Bridge, to unload a passenger. Thereafter, the driver executed a U-turn to traverse the same road, going to the direction of EDSA. At this point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta collided with the taxicab. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage to the said tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result of the incident. Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner, Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent actual, compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Issue: Whether or not Castro was Negligent.
Ruling: Decision modified. Award is reduced in half, considering the contributory negligence of the driver of private respondent's taxi.
The Supreme Court held that the driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the driver of the U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the fact that a party had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and this should not relieve him of liability. The driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U-turns are not generally advisable particularly on major streets. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had not yet fully made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi ought to have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill slope. Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part, making him contributorily liable. Most public utility drivers disregard signs and traffic rules especially during the night when traffic enforcers manning the streets disappear with the light. In driving vehicles, the primary concern should be the safety not only of the driver or his passengers, but also his fellow motorists.
Lucia Europa v Hunter Garments manufacturing (PHIL) Inc.
LUCIA EUROPA VS HUNTER GARMENTS MFG. PHIL. INC. (HUNTER)
G.R. No. 72827. 18 July 1989.
Ponente: Paras, J.:
Facts: In 1973, petitioner’s daughter, Lucrecia Europa, was employed as sample maker by the private respondent (Hunter). Sometime in the course of her employment, Lucrecia got electrocuted by the high speed sewing machine which was assigned to her by Hunter.
On 18 July 1980, petitioner filed an action for damages against Hunter based on quasi-delict. The Lower Court (LC) found for petitioner.
Issue: WON there was gross negligence on the part of private respondent as expressed in the judgment of the LC.
Ruling: Yes. Indemnity for death increased to P30,000.
The SC held that in actions based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, all damages for natural and probable consequences of the act/omission complained of are recoverable (Art. 2202 NCC).
As found by the LC, there were at least two incidents where high speed sewing machines of defendant corporation were grounded. These were brought to the attention of the management of Hunter but nothing was done. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Salvador confirmed that Lucrecia died from “shock probably secondary to electrocution.” The SC reiterated the LC and held that if the machines were frequently and regularly checked or properly maintained, the death of Lucrecia could not have come to pass.
*Daniq*
G.R. No. 72827. 18 July 1989.
Ponente: Paras, J.:
Facts: In 1973, petitioner’s daughter, Lucrecia Europa, was employed as sample maker by the private respondent (Hunter). Sometime in the course of her employment, Lucrecia got electrocuted by the high speed sewing machine which was assigned to her by Hunter.
On 18 July 1980, petitioner filed an action for damages against Hunter based on quasi-delict. The Lower Court (LC) found for petitioner.
Issue: WON there was gross negligence on the part of private respondent as expressed in the judgment of the LC.
Ruling: Yes. Indemnity for death increased to P30,000.
The SC held that in actions based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, all damages for natural and probable consequences of the act/omission complained of are recoverable (Art. 2202 NCC).
As found by the LC, there were at least two incidents where high speed sewing machines of defendant corporation were grounded. These were brought to the attention of the management of Hunter but nothing was done. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Salvador confirmed that Lucrecia died from “shock probably secondary to electrocution.” The SC reiterated the LC and held that if the machines were frequently and regularly checked or properly maintained, the death of Lucrecia could not have come to pass.
*Daniq*
Mandarin Villa, Inc. vs. CA and Clodualdo de Jesus
Mandarin Villa, Inc. vs. CA and Clodualdo de Jesus
G.R. No. 119850. 20 June 1996.
Ponente: Franciso, J.:
Facts: In the evening of 19 Oct 1989, private respondent de Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends at the peririoner’s restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village in Mandaluyong City. After dinner, the waiter handed to de Jesus the bill amounting to P2,658.50. De Jesus offered his BANKARD credit card to the waiter for payment. Minutes later, the waiter returned and audibly informed that said credit card had expired. De Jesus demonstrated that the card had yet to expire on Sept 1990, as embossed on its face. De Jesus approached the cashier who again dishonored such card. De Jesus offered his BPI express credit card instead and this was accepted, honored and verified. The trial court and CA held petitioner to be negligent.
Issues: WON petitioner was negligent; If negligent, WON such negligence was the proximate cause of private respondent’s damage.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. In the case at bar, the Point of Sale Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow under the circumstances reveals that whenever the words CARD EXPIRED flashes on screen, petitioner should check card’s expiry date as embossed in the card itself. If unexpired, petitioner should honor the card. Clearly, it has not yet expired in 19 Oct 1989 when the same was dishonored by petitioner. Hence, petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation and as such, petitioner is guilty of negligence.
The humiliation and embarrassment of private respondent was brought about by the fact of dishonor by petitioner of private respondent’s valid BANKARD. Hence, petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of private respondent’s damage.
*Daniq*
G.R. No. 119850. 20 June 1996.
Ponente: Franciso, J.:
Facts: In the evening of 19 Oct 1989, private respondent de Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends at the peririoner’s restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village in Mandaluyong City. After dinner, the waiter handed to de Jesus the bill amounting to P2,658.50. De Jesus offered his BANKARD credit card to the waiter for payment. Minutes later, the waiter returned and audibly informed that said credit card had expired. De Jesus demonstrated that the card had yet to expire on Sept 1990, as embossed on its face. De Jesus approached the cashier who again dishonored such card. De Jesus offered his BPI express credit card instead and this was accepted, honored and verified. The trial court and CA held petitioner to be negligent.
Issues: WON petitioner was negligent; If negligent, WON such negligence was the proximate cause of private respondent’s damage.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. In the case at bar, the Point of Sale Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow under the circumstances reveals that whenever the words CARD EXPIRED flashes on screen, petitioner should check card’s expiry date as embossed in the card itself. If unexpired, petitioner should honor the card. Clearly, it has not yet expired in 19 Oct 1989 when the same was dishonored by petitioner. Hence, petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation and as such, petitioner is guilty of negligence.
The humiliation and embarrassment of private respondent was brought about by the fact of dishonor by petitioner of private respondent’s valid BANKARD. Hence, petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of private respondent’s damage.
*Daniq*
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