PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK (PSBank) VS. CHOWKING FOOD CORPORATION (Chowking)
G.R. No. 177526, July 04, 2008
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA
REYES, R.T., J.:
Facts: The RTC ordered petitioner PSBank and its Bustos Branch Head, Erlinda O. Santos, to reimburse respondent Chowking the amount corresponding to five (5) illegally encashed checks. The total amount of the subject checks reached P556,981.86. On the respective due dates of each check, Chowking's acting accounting manager, Rino T. Manzano, endorsed and encashed said checks with the Bustos branch of respondent PSBank. All the five checks were honored by defendant Santos, even with only the endorsement of Manzano approving them. The signatures of the other authorized officers of respondent corporation were absent in the five (5) checks, contrary to usual banking practice. Unexpectedly, Manzano absconded with and misappropriated the check proceeds. When Chowking found out Manzano's scheme, it demanded reimbursement from PSBank. When PSBank refused to pay, Chowking filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages before the RTC. In its Answer, petitioner did not controvert the foregoing facts, but denied liability to respondent for the encashed checks. RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. On motion for reconsideration of the plaintiff, the RTC reversed its earlier decision and dismissed Chowking's complaint. In its appeal, CA granted the petition reinstating the first decision of the RTC.
Issue: WON banks' required diligence is that of pater familias.
Ruling: CA decision affirmed. Petition Denied.
It cannot be over emphasized that the banking business is impressed with public interest. Of paramount importance is the trust and confidence of the public in general in the banking industry. Consequently, the diligence required of banks is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a good father of a family. The highest degree of diligence is expected. In its declaration of policy, the General Banking Law of 2000 requires of banks the highest standards of integrity and performance. Needless to say, a bank is "under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the bank and the depositors must always be of paramount concern.
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done....Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x xEmployers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or activity.
x x x xThe responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."x x x
However, with banks like PSB, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family considering that the business of banking is imbued with public interest due to the nature of its functions. Highest degree of diligence is needed which PSB, in this case, failed to observe. x x x Its argument that it should no be held responsible for the negligent acts of Santos because those were independent acts x x x perpetrated without its knowledge and consent is without basis in fact and in law. Assuming that PSB did not err in hiring Santos for her position, its lack of supervision over her made it solidarily liable for the unauthorized encashment of the checks involved. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. The appellee, in this case, presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored compliance therewith. x x x
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Sunday, February 22, 2009
People vs. Bagnate
PEOPLE VS. BAGNATE
FACTS: Amado Bagnate was found guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. T-2874 for killing his grandmother, Aurea Brona and rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. T-2875 for killing and raping his niece, Rosalie Rayala. Accused was convicted on the strength of his extra- judicial confession. The RTC, aside from the punishment of death penalty awarded P50,000.00 each to the victim.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of damages is correct.
RULING: The award of civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages, which is based on a different jural foundation and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. Considering that the prosecution failed to show any proof that the heirs of Aurea Broña are entitled to moral damages, the same may not be awarded. In accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Considering the generic aggravating circumstances of disregard of age of the victim and dwelling, the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.
The Court, however, has to modify the award of civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of Rosalie Rayala. Recent rulings increased the amount of civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide to P100,000.00. The heirs of Rosalie must be awarded the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages without need of proof, in view of the rape suffered by victim Rosalie. Considering that the crime of rape was committed inside the dwelling of the victim, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be awarded to the heirs of Rosalie.
The Court finds that the heirs of both Aurea and Rosalie should be awarded the amount of P54,259.00 as actual damages in view of the admission made by the defense that the family of Aurea and Rosalie incurred expenses in said amount.
*Mia
FACTS: Amado Bagnate was found guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. T-2874 for killing his grandmother, Aurea Brona and rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. T-2875 for killing and raping his niece, Rosalie Rayala. Accused was convicted on the strength of his extra- judicial confession. The RTC, aside from the punishment of death penalty awarded P50,000.00 each to the victim.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of damages is correct.
RULING: The award of civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages, which is based on a different jural foundation and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. Considering that the prosecution failed to show any proof that the heirs of Aurea Broña are entitled to moral damages, the same may not be awarded. In accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Considering the generic aggravating circumstances of disregard of age of the victim and dwelling, the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.
The Court, however, has to modify the award of civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of Rosalie Rayala. Recent rulings increased the amount of civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide to P100,000.00. The heirs of Rosalie must be awarded the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages without need of proof, in view of the rape suffered by victim Rosalie. Considering that the crime of rape was committed inside the dwelling of the victim, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be awarded to the heirs of Rosalie.
The Court finds that the heirs of both Aurea and Rosalie should be awarded the amount of P54,259.00 as actual damages in view of the admission made by the defense that the family of Aurea and Rosalie incurred expenses in said amount.
*Mia
BPI v CASA MONTESSORI INTL
BPI VS. CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONAL
FACTS: On November 8, 1982, CASA Montessori International opened Current AccouNT with BPI with CASA’s President Lebron as one of its authorized signatories. In 1991, after conducting an investigation, plaintiff discovered that nine of its checks had been encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos since 1990 in the total amount of P782,000.00. It turned out that Santos with account at BPI Greenbelt Branch was a fictitious name used by third party defendant Leonardo T. Yabut who worked as external auditor of CASA. Third party defendant voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature of Lebron and encashed the checks. In 1991, plaintiff filed Complaint for Collection with Damages against defendant bank praying that the latter be ordered to reinstate the amount of P782,500.00 with interest. RTC rendered decision in favor of the plaintiff. CA modified decision holding CASA as contributory negligent hence ordered Yabut to reimburse BPI half the total amount claimed and CASA, the other half. It also disallowed attorney’s fees and moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: W/N moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees should be awarded.
RULING: Moral and exemplary damages denied but atty.’s fees granted.
In the absence of a wrongful act or omission, or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded. The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful, or the party liable for it.CASA was unable to identify the particular instance upon which its claim for moral damages is predicated. Neither bad faith nor negligence so gross that it amounts to malice can be imputed to BPI.
Imposed by way of correction for the public good, exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. There is no bad faith on the part of BPI for paying the checks of CASA upon forged signatures. Therefore, the former cannot be said to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. The latter, having no right to moral damages, cannot demand exemplary damages.
When the act or omission of the defendant has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect the latter’s interest, or where the court deems it just and equitable, attorney’s fees may be recovered. In the present case, BPI persistently denied the claim of CASA under the NIL to recredit the latter’s account for the value of the forged checks. This denial constrained CASA to incur expenses and exert effort for more than ten years in order to protect its corporate interest in its bank account.
*Mia
Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Cristeto Dinopol
GR. No. 75195
August 29, 1988
Facts: On July 31, 1984, rivate respondent Abundio T. Merced doing business under the name and style of southern Engineering Works, filed an action in the trial court for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner Davao Light and Power Co., Inc., for abruptly disconnecting his electric meter as a result of which he suffered moral damages, loss of business and credit standing, and loss of profits. On Dec. 11, 1985 and Jan. 27, 1986, petitioner filed a motion and supplemental motion, respectively, to require rivate respondent to pay additional docket fees on his qualified claims for damages. On Feb. 14, 1986, respondent Judge Dinopol denied two motions to require private respondent to pay additional docket fees. Upon motion for reconsideration, four months had elapsed without respondent judge resolving the same. Hence, this petition.
Issue: (1) WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion.
(2) WON Abundio Merced should be awarded damages.
Ruling: Petition Granted
Ratio:
(1) When respondent judge refused to order the re-assessment, he committed grave abuse of discretion. He acted in contravention of Rule 11 of the Interim Rules of court which was laready in effect when the complaint for damages was brought before his sala. Such actuation calls for the corrective writ of certiorari.
(2) Merced should specify the amount of damages being sought, not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, or his action will be dismissed.
*Dre
August 29, 1988
Facts: On July 31, 1984, rivate respondent Abundio T. Merced doing business under the name and style of southern Engineering Works, filed an action in the trial court for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner Davao Light and Power Co., Inc., for abruptly disconnecting his electric meter as a result of which he suffered moral damages, loss of business and credit standing, and loss of profits. On Dec. 11, 1985 and Jan. 27, 1986, petitioner filed a motion and supplemental motion, respectively, to require rivate respondent to pay additional docket fees on his qualified claims for damages. On Feb. 14, 1986, respondent Judge Dinopol denied two motions to require private respondent to pay additional docket fees. Upon motion for reconsideration, four months had elapsed without respondent judge resolving the same. Hence, this petition.
Issue: (1) WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion.
(2) WON Abundio Merced should be awarded damages.
Ruling: Petition Granted
Ratio:
(1) When respondent judge refused to order the re-assessment, he committed grave abuse of discretion. He acted in contravention of Rule 11 of the Interim Rules of court which was laready in effect when the complaint for damages was brought before his sala. Such actuation calls for the corrective writ of certiorari.
(2) Merced should specify the amount of damages being sought, not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, or his action will be dismissed.
*Dre
Manuel vs. Alfeche
Gr. No. 115683
July 26, 1996
Facts: On Sept. 20-22, 1991, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, the said accused, Felipe Colino, being the writer/author, Danny Fajardo, Editor-in-chief, Lemuel T. Fernandez, Associate editor, and John Paul Tia, Assistant Editor of a regional newspaper known as "Panay News" which has considerable circulation in Panay Island and throughout Western Visayas, conspiring and mutually helping each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malicious intent of impeaching the integrity, credibility, honor, and reputation of Delia Manuel, as article in the front page and/or headline entitled "Local Shabu Peddler now a Millionaire" The RTC dismissed the claim for recovery of moral damages by the offended party. Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this instant petition for review.
Issue: WON the offended party should recover moral damages.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed
Ratio:
The complainant expressly claims moral, exemplary, temperate and/or nominal damages but has not specified any amount at all, leaving the quantification thereof entirely to the trial court's discretion, and not to a situation where the litigant specifies some amounts or parameters for the awards being sought, even though the different types of damages sought be not separately or individually quantified.
*Dre
July 26, 1996
Facts: On Sept. 20-22, 1991, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, the said accused, Felipe Colino, being the writer/author, Danny Fajardo, Editor-in-chief, Lemuel T. Fernandez, Associate editor, and John Paul Tia, Assistant Editor of a regional newspaper known as "Panay News" which has considerable circulation in Panay Island and throughout Western Visayas, conspiring and mutually helping each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malicious intent of impeaching the integrity, credibility, honor, and reputation of Delia Manuel, as article in the front page and/or headline entitled "Local Shabu Peddler now a Millionaire" The RTC dismissed the claim for recovery of moral damages by the offended party. Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this instant petition for review.
Issue: WON the offended party should recover moral damages.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed
Ratio:
The complainant expressly claims moral, exemplary, temperate and/or nominal damages but has not specified any amount at all, leaving the quantification thereof entirely to the trial court's discretion, and not to a situation where the litigant specifies some amounts or parameters for the awards being sought, even though the different types of damages sought be not separately or individually quantified.
*Dre
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Jervoso vs. People
Marcelo Jervoso and Norma Closa vs People of the Phils. and CA
G.R. No. 89306 September 13, 1990
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
Griño-Aquino, J.:
Facts: RTC of Manila and the CA convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso of homicide for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso; and convicted Marcelo’s wife, Norma Closa, of slight physical injuries committed against the deceased. The RTC imposed the penalty of imprisonment and ordered the petitioners to indemnify the heirs of the deceased R. Jervoso in the amount of P30,000. CA affirmed the order of indemnification.
Issue: WON indemnity may be recovered by the heirs of R. Jervoso despite the reservation by the said heirs of their right to file a separate civil action against the accused.
Ruling: CA decision affirmed, except the award of P30,000 as indemnity for damages which should be deleted.
Sec 1 Rule 111 of the RC states that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the RPC, and damages under Arts 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the CC arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of the said civil actions separately waives the others.
The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide. Having reserved and filed in the RTC Mla a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased R. Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of R. Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the award.
*DAN’Q
G.R. No. 89306 September 13, 1990
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
Griño-Aquino, J.:
Facts: RTC of Manila and the CA convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso of homicide for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso; and convicted Marcelo’s wife, Norma Closa, of slight physical injuries committed against the deceased. The RTC imposed the penalty of imprisonment and ordered the petitioners to indemnify the heirs of the deceased R. Jervoso in the amount of P30,000. CA affirmed the order of indemnification.
Issue: WON indemnity may be recovered by the heirs of R. Jervoso despite the reservation by the said heirs of their right to file a separate civil action against the accused.
Ruling: CA decision affirmed, except the award of P30,000 as indemnity for damages which should be deleted.
Sec 1 Rule 111 of the RC states that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the RPC, and damages under Arts 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the CC arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of the said civil actions separately waives the others.
The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide. Having reserved and filed in the RTC Mla a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased R. Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of R. Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the award.
*DAN’Q
Araos vs. CA
Araos, et. al. vs. CA and Jovan Land, Inc.
G.R. No. 107057 June 2, 1994
Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA’s decision
DAVIDE, J.:
Facts: Petitioners are lessees of a 10-door apartment building which they have been occupying for 25 years. The building was originally owned by Bernardino. After the expiration of the lease contract (31 Jan ’88) between the petitioners and Bernardino, the petitioners, nevertheless occupied their respective units and the lessor continued to collect monthly rentals from the petitioners despite the absence of a written contract. On 11 July 1991, the apartment was sold to Jovan Land, Inc. Three days after, demands to vacate the apartment units were made simultaneously by Bernardino and Jovan Land. When the demands went unheeded, cases for unlawful detainer were files against petitioners before the MeTC Manila. The MeTC ordered defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the increased Rental Arrearages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC. CA reversed RTC and affirmed the MeTC decision.
Issue: WON actual damages include the increased rate in rentals.
Ruling: Petition is partly Granted and CA decision modified by setting aside the increase in rentals fixed therein and ordered petitioners to pay the accumulated rentals until they shall have effectively vacated the leased premises.
There is no basis for the increase in the rentals. The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
*DAN’Q
G.R. No. 107057 June 2, 1994
Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA’s decision
DAVIDE, J.:
Facts: Petitioners are lessees of a 10-door apartment building which they have been occupying for 25 years. The building was originally owned by Bernardino. After the expiration of the lease contract (31 Jan ’88) between the petitioners and Bernardino, the petitioners, nevertheless occupied their respective units and the lessor continued to collect monthly rentals from the petitioners despite the absence of a written contract. On 11 July 1991, the apartment was sold to Jovan Land, Inc. Three days after, demands to vacate the apartment units were made simultaneously by Bernardino and Jovan Land. When the demands went unheeded, cases for unlawful detainer were files against petitioners before the MeTC Manila. The MeTC ordered defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the increased Rental Arrearages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC. CA reversed RTC and affirmed the MeTC decision.
Issue: WON actual damages include the increased rate in rentals.
Ruling: Petition is partly Granted and CA decision modified by setting aside the increase in rentals fixed therein and ordered petitioners to pay the accumulated rentals until they shall have effectively vacated the leased premises.
There is no basis for the increase in the rentals. The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
*DAN’Q
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
Marcia vs. CA
MARCIA VS. CA
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA
RELOVA, J.:
FACTS: In 1956, a passenger bus in Pampanga operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga. A month later, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by petitioners against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. Paje was convicted by the CFI but was acquitted on appeal ruling that appellant was not even guilty of civil negligence and that it was a pure accident. The CFI of Rizal subsequently dismissed the civil case.
ISSUE: W/N the civil action is an independent one, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
*Mia
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA
RELOVA, J.:
FACTS: In 1956, a passenger bus in Pampanga operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga. A month later, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by petitioners against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. Paje was convicted by the CFI but was acquitted on appeal ruling that appellant was not even guilty of civil negligence and that it was a pure accident. The CFI of Rizal subsequently dismissed the civil case.
ISSUE: W/N the civil action is an independent one, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
*Mia
Monday, February 16, 2009
PAL vs. Miano
Philippine Airlines vs. Florante Miano
G.R. No. 106664 March 8, 1995.
Petition to review the decision of the RTC Makati
Puno, J.:
Facts: On August 31, 1988, private respondent took petitioner's flight bound for Germany. He had an immediate onward connecting flight via Lufthansa flight to Vienna, Austria. At the NAIA, he checked-in one brown suitcase but did not declare a higher valuation. He claimed that his suitcase contained money, documents, one Nikkon camera with zoom lens, etc. Upon private respondent's arrival at Vienna, his checked-in baggage was missing. He reported the matter to the authorities and after three (3) hours of waiting, he proceeded to Piestany, Czechoslovakia. Eleven (11) days after, his suitcase was delivered to him in Piestany. Private respondent instituted an action for damages before the RTC Makati which rendered a decision awarding private respondent moral and exemplary damages and atty’s fees.
Issue: WON the RTC erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages to private respondent.
Ruling: Assailed Decision MODIFIED deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The trial court erred in awarding moral damages to private respondent. The established facts evince that petitioner's late delivery of the baggage for eleven (11) days was not motivated by ill will or bad faith. The SC neither sustained the award of exemplary damages. The prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or quasi-contract is that the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The undisputed facts do not so warrant the characterization of the action of petitioner.
The award of attorney's fees must also be disallowed for lack of legal leg to stand on. Needless to say, award of attorney’s fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.
*DAN’Q
G.R. No. 106664 March 8, 1995.
Petition to review the decision of the RTC Makati
Puno, J.:
Facts: On August 31, 1988, private respondent took petitioner's flight bound for Germany. He had an immediate onward connecting flight via Lufthansa flight to Vienna, Austria. At the NAIA, he checked-in one brown suitcase but did not declare a higher valuation. He claimed that his suitcase contained money, documents, one Nikkon camera with zoom lens, etc. Upon private respondent's arrival at Vienna, his checked-in baggage was missing. He reported the matter to the authorities and after three (3) hours of waiting, he proceeded to Piestany, Czechoslovakia. Eleven (11) days after, his suitcase was delivered to him in Piestany. Private respondent instituted an action for damages before the RTC Makati which rendered a decision awarding private respondent moral and exemplary damages and atty’s fees.
Issue: WON the RTC erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages to private respondent.
Ruling: Assailed Decision MODIFIED deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The trial court erred in awarding moral damages to private respondent. The established facts evince that petitioner's late delivery of the baggage for eleven (11) days was not motivated by ill will or bad faith. The SC neither sustained the award of exemplary damages. The prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or quasi-contract is that the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The undisputed facts do not so warrant the characterization of the action of petitioner.
The award of attorney's fees must also be disallowed for lack of legal leg to stand on. Needless to say, award of attorney’s fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.
*DAN’Q
ARAFILES VS. PHIL. JOURNALISTS INC., et al.
ARAFILES VS. PHIL. JOURNALISTS INC., et al.
FACTS: About 2 a.m., while respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal Tonight, was at the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. Emelita executed a sworn affidavit which was later on written in the police blotter and perused by Morales. The latter interviewed Emelita. The following day, the article appeared in the headline of respondent’s newspaper which wrote, GOV’T EXEC RAPES COED. About a year following the publication, petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC against respondents for damages. Petitioner alleged that because of the article, his reputation was injured. Respondent answered that his write-up was protected by the constitution on freedom of the press. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
ISSSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages.
RULING: Petition denied.
In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
*Mia
FACTS: About 2 a.m., while respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal Tonight, was at the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. Emelita executed a sworn affidavit which was later on written in the police blotter and perused by Morales. The latter interviewed Emelita. The following day, the article appeared in the headline of respondent’s newspaper which wrote, GOV’T EXEC RAPES COED. About a year following the publication, petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC against respondents for damages. Petitioner alleged that because of the article, his reputation was injured. Respondent answered that his write-up was protected by the constitution on freedom of the press. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
ISSSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages.
RULING: Petition denied.
In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
*Mia
Friday, February 13, 2009
EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., & VEGAFRIA
EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., & VEGAFRIA
G.R. NO. 82146 January 22, 1990. (Kinds of Damages)
PETITION for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the RTC
FERNAN, C.J.:
Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas." Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner.
Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
*DAN’Q
G.R. NO. 82146 January 22, 1990. (Kinds of Damages)
PETITION for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the RTC
FERNAN, C.J.:
Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas." Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner.
Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
*DAN’Q
VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAÑEDA, JR., ET. AL.
VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAÑEDA, JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218.
Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria.
*DAN’Q
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218.
Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria.
*DAN’Q
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Consunji vs. CA
Facts:
On Nov. 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego´s widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a compalint for damages against the deceased´s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow´s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.
Ruling. The deision of the CA is affirmed.
Ratio:
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private resppondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
*dre
On Nov. 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego´s widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a compalint for damages against the deceased´s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow´s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.
Ruling. The deision of the CA is affirmed.
Ratio:
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private resppondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
*dre
Thursday, February 5, 2009
PONCE VS. LEGASPI
PONCE VS. LEGASPI
FACTS: Petitioner Ponce and husband Manuel, owned 43% of the stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR). 48% of it was owned by the spouses Porter.The allegations of petitioner states that during the time while respondent Legaspi is the legal counsel of L’NOR, there occurred fraudulent manipulations by spouses Porter and other officers; that with the aid of Legaspi, they incorporated the Yrasport Drydocks, Inc. which was done to compete with L’NOR but still used the office space, equipments and goodwill of L’NOR. On account of flagrant frauds committed by Porter, a charge for estafa was filed where Legaspi appeared as counsel for Porter; that complainant asked Legaspi to take steps to protect L’NOR but the latter refused. Complainant filed for disbarment against Legaspi which was dismissed. Legaspi subsequently filed a complaint for damages against petitioner which was granted by the lower court and affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: W/N the complaint for damages by Legaspi is justified.
RULING: Decision reversed and set aside.
RATIO: While generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits, the foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character and therefore may be the basis for a subsequent action for malicious prosecution. However, malice and want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action. In the case at bar, in the mind of petitioner, the act of the respondent in appearing as counsel for Porter, who had allegedly swindled L'NOR, the interest of which he was duty bound to protect, constituted grave misconduct and gross malpractice. Since the petitioner, however, was of the honest perception that YRASPORT was actually organized to appropriate for itself some of L'NOR's business, then we find that she had probable cause to file the disbarment suit.
Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
*Mia
FACTS: Petitioner Ponce and husband Manuel, owned 43% of the stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR). 48% of it was owned by the spouses Porter.The allegations of petitioner states that during the time while respondent Legaspi is the legal counsel of L’NOR, there occurred fraudulent manipulations by spouses Porter and other officers; that with the aid of Legaspi, they incorporated the Yrasport Drydocks, Inc. which was done to compete with L’NOR but still used the office space, equipments and goodwill of L’NOR. On account of flagrant frauds committed by Porter, a charge for estafa was filed where Legaspi appeared as counsel for Porter; that complainant asked Legaspi to take steps to protect L’NOR but the latter refused. Complainant filed for disbarment against Legaspi which was dismissed. Legaspi subsequently filed a complaint for damages against petitioner which was granted by the lower court and affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: W/N the complaint for damages by Legaspi is justified.
RULING: Decision reversed and set aside.
RATIO: While generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits, the foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character and therefore may be the basis for a subsequent action for malicious prosecution. However, malice and want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action. In the case at bar, in the mind of petitioner, the act of the respondent in appearing as counsel for Porter, who had allegedly swindled L'NOR, the interest of which he was duty bound to protect, constituted grave misconduct and gross malpractice. Since the petitioner, however, was of the honest perception that YRASPORT was actually organized to appropriate for itself some of L'NOR's business, then we find that she had probable cause to file the disbarment suit.
Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
*Mia
Manantan vs CA
MANANTAN VS. CA
FACTS: In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing said automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeep resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.
ISSUE: W/N the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
*Mia
FACTS: In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing said automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeep resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.
ISSUE: W/N the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
*Mia
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
Silahis International Hotel, Inc vs Soluta
G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.
RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x
In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
DECISION: Denied.
*SUGAR
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.
RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x
In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
DECISION: Denied.
*SUGAR
Javellana vs Tayo
G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962
ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
vs.
SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-appellant.
FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the time the acts herein below complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality. The Municipal Council of Buenavista (Council) unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960 which set the regular sessions of the Council and which resolution was duly approved by the respondent. At the time and place set for the regular session of the Council, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who are the petitioners in this case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a temporary presiding officer and a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to do business. On the subsequent Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors and Secretary were still not around. When the Minutes of the Proceeding was presented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution as approved by the Council, the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as null and void and not in accordance with.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid
RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as long as there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. To declare that the proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Public interest will immensely suffer, if a mayor who belongs to one political group refuses to call or attend a session, because the Council is controlled by another political group. (And this was upheld by the SC.)
We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty, not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal an the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session in question.
DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed.
*SUGAR
ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
vs.
SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-appellant.
FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the time the acts herein below complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality. The Municipal Council of Buenavista (Council) unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960 which set the regular sessions of the Council and which resolution was duly approved by the respondent. At the time and place set for the regular session of the Council, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who are the petitioners in this case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a temporary presiding officer and a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to do business. On the subsequent Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors and Secretary were still not around. When the Minutes of the Proceeding was presented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution as approved by the Council, the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as null and void and not in accordance with.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid
RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as long as there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. To declare that the proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Public interest will immensely suffer, if a mayor who belongs to one political group refuses to call or attend a session, because the Council is controlled by another political group. (And this was upheld by the SC.)
We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty, not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal an the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session in question.
DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed.
*SUGAR
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Amaro vs. Sumanguit
CORNELIO AMARO and JOSE AMARO vs. AMBROSIO SUMANGUIT
G.R. No. L-14986 July 31, 1962
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Negros Occidental
Makalintal, J.:
Facts: Appellant Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay; that the following day he, together with his father and his witnesses, went to the office of the defendant chief of police but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized. In view thereof they gave up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime. Amaro filed a complaint against chief of police for damages which motion the court dismissed.
Issue: WON chief of police be held liable for damages under art 27 of the CC
Ruling: ORDER APPEALED from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings.
The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law.
*Dan
G.R. No. L-14986 July 31, 1962
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Negros Occidental
Makalintal, J.:
Facts: Appellant Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay; that the following day he, together with his father and his witnesses, went to the office of the defendant chief of police but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized. In view thereof they gave up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime. Amaro filed a complaint against chief of police for damages which motion the court dismissed.
Issue: WON chief of police be held liable for damages under art 27 of the CC
Ruling: ORDER APPEALED from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings.
The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law.
*Dan
Phil Match Co., Ltd., vs City of Cebu
PHIL. MATCH CO., LTD., vs. CITY OF CEBU & JESUS ZABATE (Acting City Treasurer)
G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Cebu
Aquino, J.:
Facts: Petitioner, engaged in manufacturing of matches, assails the legality of the tax which the city treasure collected on out-of-town deliveries of matches by virtue of the city ordinance which taxes good stored and/or sold within the city. The company sought refund of the sales tax and for damages against the city treasurer fo r not following the advise of the city fiscal, as legal adviser of the city, that all out-of-town deliveries of matches are not subject to sales tax. The trial court dismissed the complaint against the city treasurer.
Issue: WON the city treasurer can be held liable for damages under art. 27 of the CC
Ruling: Judgment AFFIRMED.
Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that "any person suffering material or moral lose because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken." Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In the case at bar, the records clearly show that the city treasurer honestly believed that he was justified under the ordinance to collect taxes. The fiscal’s opinion on the legality of such or any other ordinance is merely advisory and has no binding effects.
As a rule, Where an officer is invested with discretion in matters brought before him and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result or an erroneous or mistaken decision, provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority and without malice, or corruption. It has been held previously by the SC that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages Cabungcal vs. Cordovan 120 Phil. 667).
*Dan
G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Cebu
Aquino, J.:
Facts: Petitioner, engaged in manufacturing of matches, assails the legality of the tax which the city treasure collected on out-of-town deliveries of matches by virtue of the city ordinance which taxes good stored and/or sold within the city. The company sought refund of the sales tax and for damages against the city treasurer fo r not following the advise of the city fiscal, as legal adviser of the city, that all out-of-town deliveries of matches are not subject to sales tax. The trial court dismissed the complaint against the city treasurer.
Issue: WON the city treasurer can be held liable for damages under art. 27 of the CC
Ruling: Judgment AFFIRMED.
Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that "any person suffering material or moral lose because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken." Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In the case at bar, the records clearly show that the city treasurer honestly believed that he was justified under the ordinance to collect taxes. The fiscal’s opinion on the legality of such or any other ordinance is merely advisory and has no binding effects.
As a rule, Where an officer is invested with discretion in matters brought before him and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result or an erroneous or mistaken decision, provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority and without malice, or corruption. It has been held previously by the SC that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages Cabungcal vs. Cordovan 120 Phil. 667).
*Dan
Thursday, January 29, 2009
DE TAVERA VS. PHIL. TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY
DE TAVERA VS. PHIL. TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY
GR. No. L-48928 February 25, 1982
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiff is a doctor of Medicine by profession and a recognized specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis. She is a member of the Board of Directors of the defendant Society, in representation of the PCSO. She was duly appointed as Executive Secretary of the Society. On May 29, 1974, the past Board of Directors removed her summarily from her position, the lawful cause of which she was not informed, through the simple expedient of declaring her position vacant. Defendant Romulo was appointed to the position and defendants Pardo, Nubla, Garcia and Adil, not being members of defendant Society were elevated as members of the Board of Directors. Not being qualified, petitioner alleged said acts to be null and void. The court a quo rendered a decision holding that the present suit being one for quo warranto it should be filed within one year from plaintiff's ouster from office; that nevertheless, plaintiff was not illegally removed from her position as Executive Secretary in The Society since plaintiff was holding an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power and hence temporary.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was illegally removed and thus entitled to damages.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: The action is primarily against the Society and the past members of the Board who are responsible for her removal. Where the respondents, except for Romulo, are not actually holding the office in question, the suit could not be one for quo warranto.
The absence of a fixed term in the letter addressed to petitioner informing her of her appointment as Executive Secretary is very significant. This could have no other implication than that petitioner held an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power.
Petitioner cannot likewise seek relief from the general provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations nor from the fundamental principles of the New Constitution on preservation of human dignity. While these provisions present some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability of social order, these are merely guides for human conduct in the absence of specific legal provisions and definite contractual stipulations. In the case at bar, the Code of By-Laws of the Society contains a specific provision governing the term of office of petitioner. The same necessarily limits her rights under the New Civil Code and the New Constitution upon acceptance of the appointment.
*Mia
GR. No. L-48928 February 25, 1982
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiff is a doctor of Medicine by profession and a recognized specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis. She is a member of the Board of Directors of the defendant Society, in representation of the PCSO. She was duly appointed as Executive Secretary of the Society. On May 29, 1974, the past Board of Directors removed her summarily from her position, the lawful cause of which she was not informed, through the simple expedient of declaring her position vacant. Defendant Romulo was appointed to the position and defendants Pardo, Nubla, Garcia and Adil, not being members of defendant Society were elevated as members of the Board of Directors. Not being qualified, petitioner alleged said acts to be null and void. The court a quo rendered a decision holding that the present suit being one for quo warranto it should be filed within one year from plaintiff's ouster from office; that nevertheless, plaintiff was not illegally removed from her position as Executive Secretary in The Society since plaintiff was holding an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power and hence temporary.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was illegally removed and thus entitled to damages.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: The action is primarily against the Society and the past members of the Board who are responsible for her removal. Where the respondents, except for Romulo, are not actually holding the office in question, the suit could not be one for quo warranto.
The absence of a fixed term in the letter addressed to petitioner informing her of her appointment as Executive Secretary is very significant. This could have no other implication than that petitioner held an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power.
Petitioner cannot likewise seek relief from the general provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations nor from the fundamental principles of the New Constitution on preservation of human dignity. While these provisions present some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability of social order, these are merely guides for human conduct in the absence of specific legal provisions and definite contractual stipulations. In the case at bar, the Code of By-Laws of the Society contains a specific provision governing the term of office of petitioner. The same necessarily limits her rights under the New Civil Code and the New Constitution upon acceptance of the appointment.
*Mia
BONZON VS STANDARD OIL
BONZON VS STANDARD OIL
G.R. No. L-8851 March 16, 1914
Appeal
Carson, J.:
FACTS: The complaint appellees, in substance, that plaintiff purchased certain real estate at an execution sale, paying therefor the sum of P2,170 to the defendant sheriff, who turned over the purchase price to the defendant company, the execution creditor, at whose instance the sale was had; that thereafter, plaintiff having gone into possession of the land was evicted therefrom in judicial proceedings, wherein the court found that the land in question was the property of certain third parties, and that neither the judgment debtor nor the purchaser at the execution sale had any title thereto. The prayer of the complaint is for judgment against the judgment creditor and the sheriff for the amount of the purchase price paid at the execution sale.
ISSUE: Is there an irregularity the proceedings of the sale?
RULING: under the general principles tat one person may not enrich himself at the expense of another, a judgment creditor would not be permitted to retain the purchaser price of land sold as the property of the judgment debtor after it has been made to appear that the judgment debtor had no title to the land and that the purchaser had failed to secure title thereto, and we find no difficulty therefore in accepting a liberal construction of the statute which arrives at the same equitable result.The plaintiff's right to recovery from the judgment creditor not being predicated on the theory of an express or implied warranty of title, defendant's contentions based on the provisions of article 1481 of the code need not be considered at this time. If defendant was not given an opportunity to be heard in the eviction proceedings, it would seem that he can avail himself in the pending action of any defense which if set up in the former action would have relieved him from liability to reimburse the purchaser.
DECISION: reversing the order of the court below sustaining the demurrer to the complaint, and directing that the record be returned to the court below for further proceedings.
*Suggy
G.R. No. L-8851 March 16, 1914
Appeal
Carson, J.:
FACTS: The complaint appellees, in substance, that plaintiff purchased certain real estate at an execution sale, paying therefor the sum of P2,170 to the defendant sheriff, who turned over the purchase price to the defendant company, the execution creditor, at whose instance the sale was had; that thereafter, plaintiff having gone into possession of the land was evicted therefrom in judicial proceedings, wherein the court found that the land in question was the property of certain third parties, and that neither the judgment debtor nor the purchaser at the execution sale had any title thereto. The prayer of the complaint is for judgment against the judgment creditor and the sheriff for the amount of the purchase price paid at the execution sale.
ISSUE: Is there an irregularity the proceedings of the sale?
RULING: under the general principles tat one person may not enrich himself at the expense of another, a judgment creditor would not be permitted to retain the purchaser price of land sold as the property of the judgment debtor after it has been made to appear that the judgment debtor had no title to the land and that the purchaser had failed to secure title thereto, and we find no difficulty therefore in accepting a liberal construction of the statute which arrives at the same equitable result.The plaintiff's right to recovery from the judgment creditor not being predicated on the theory of an express or implied warranty of title, defendant's contentions based on the provisions of article 1481 of the code need not be considered at this time. If defendant was not given an opportunity to be heard in the eviction proceedings, it would seem that he can avail himself in the pending action of any defense which if set up in the former action would have relieved him from liability to reimburse the purchaser.
DECISION: reversing the order of the court below sustaining the demurrer to the complaint, and directing that the record be returned to the court below for further proceedings.
*Suggy
Wassmer vs Velez
WASSMER VS VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
ISSUE: Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?
RULING: Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
DECISION: Affirmed.
*Suggy
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
FILINVEST vs. CA
FILINVEST vs. CA
G.R. No. 115902. 27 Sept 1995.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA
Davide, Jr., J.:
Facts: On Aug 26, 1978 FILINVEST awarde to the defendant PACIFIC the development of the residential subdivision consisting of two lands located in Payatas, QC. PACIFIC issued two surety bonds issued by PHILAMGEN. PACIFIC failed to finish the contracted work, FILINVEST intends to take over the project and hold defendant liable for damages.
On October 26, plaintiff submitted its claim against PHILAMGEN under its performance and guarantee bond but PHILAMGEN refused to acknowledge its liability for the single reason that its principal, defendant pacific, refused to acknowledge liability therefore. Defendant said that the failure to finish the contracted work was due to the weather, and the grant of extension of the work is a waiver to claim any damages. PHILAMGEN contends that the various amendments made on the principal contract and the deviation in the implementation thereof which were resorted to by plaintiff and PACIFIC w/o its consent have automatically released the latter from any liability. The tc dismissed the complaint, basing on the commissioner report. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON the liquidated damages agrees upon by the parties should be reduced.
Held: Decision of CA AFFIRMED.
Ratio: Art. 1226 in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty of shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.
As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom of the parties to agree on such terms and conditions as they see fit, as long as they are not contrary to law. But the courts may equitably reduce the penalty in two instances, first,if the principal obligation has been irregularly complied with and second, when it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
*Ash
G.R. No. 115902. 27 Sept 1995.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA
Davide, Jr., J.:
Facts: On Aug 26, 1978 FILINVEST awarde to the defendant PACIFIC the development of the residential subdivision consisting of two lands located in Payatas, QC. PACIFIC issued two surety bonds issued by PHILAMGEN. PACIFIC failed to finish the contracted work, FILINVEST intends to take over the project and hold defendant liable for damages.
On October 26, plaintiff submitted its claim against PHILAMGEN under its performance and guarantee bond but PHILAMGEN refused to acknowledge its liability for the single reason that its principal, defendant pacific, refused to acknowledge liability therefore. Defendant said that the failure to finish the contracted work was due to the weather, and the grant of extension of the work is a waiver to claim any damages. PHILAMGEN contends that the various amendments made on the principal contract and the deviation in the implementation thereof which were resorted to by plaintiff and PACIFIC w/o its consent have automatically released the latter from any liability. The tc dismissed the complaint, basing on the commissioner report. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON the liquidated damages agrees upon by the parties should be reduced.
Held: Decision of CA AFFIRMED.
Ratio: Art. 1226 in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty of shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.
As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom of the parties to agree on such terms and conditions as they see fit, as long as they are not contrary to law. But the courts may equitably reduce the penalty in two instances, first,if the principal obligation has been irregularly complied with and second, when it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
*Ash
SBTC vs CA
Security and Trust Company and R. Manhit vs CA and Ferrer
G.R. No. 117009. 11 Oct 1995.
Petition to review and reverse the decision of the CA
Padilla, J.:
Facts: Ferrer was contracted by the SBTC to construct a bldg in Davao. The contract provided that it be finished within 200 working days, it was finished upon stipulated time but additional expenses were incurred amounting to 300k on top of the original cost, these expenses were made known to SBTC and timely demands for the payment of the increased cost were done by Ferrer to SBTC, the latter only recommended that the verified cost is 200k. SBTC contend that in the contract, should there be any increase in the expenses, the “owner shall equitably make the appropriate adjustment on mutual agreement of both parties.” Ferrer filed for damages and the trial court ruled in his favor, the defendants were ordered to pay. On appeal, CA affirmed the tc’s decision.
Issue: WON SBTC is liable for damages and payment of the additional expenses.
Held: CA decision AFFIRMED.
Ratio: Art. 22 states that, “Every person who through an act or performance by another or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.”
It is not denied that private respondent incurred additional expenses in constructing petitioner bank’s bldg due to a drastic and unexpected in construction cost. Hence, to allow petitioner bank to acquire the constructed bldg at a price far below its actual cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of Ferrer, such cannot be allowed by law.
*Ash
G.R. No. 117009. 11 Oct 1995.
Petition to review and reverse the decision of the CA
Padilla, J.:
Facts: Ferrer was contracted by the SBTC to construct a bldg in Davao. The contract provided that it be finished within 200 working days, it was finished upon stipulated time but additional expenses were incurred amounting to 300k on top of the original cost, these expenses were made known to SBTC and timely demands for the payment of the increased cost were done by Ferrer to SBTC, the latter only recommended that the verified cost is 200k. SBTC contend that in the contract, should there be any increase in the expenses, the “owner shall equitably make the appropriate adjustment on mutual agreement of both parties.” Ferrer filed for damages and the trial court ruled in his favor, the defendants were ordered to pay. On appeal, CA affirmed the tc’s decision.
Issue: WON SBTC is liable for damages and payment of the additional expenses.
Held: CA decision AFFIRMED.
Ratio: Art. 22 states that, “Every person who through an act or performance by another or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.”
It is not denied that private respondent incurred additional expenses in constructing petitioner bank’s bldg due to a drastic and unexpected in construction cost. Hence, to allow petitioner bank to acquire the constructed bldg at a price far below its actual cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the prejudice of Ferrer, such cannot be allowed by law.
*Ash
ROQUE VS. TORRES
ROQUE VS. TORRES
G.R. No. 157632. December 6, 2006.
Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the RC assailing the decision of the CA
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS: A complaint for damages was filed against the respondent on account of the acts of the security guard employed by him, by shooting the plaintiff resulting in death. Respondent employed security guards to prevent the plaintiff from entering a parcel of land despite knowledge that he did not own the same and that there was a title under the name of the plaintiff’s son. When the latter insisted in entering the land, the guards shoot him. He filed a complaint but there was substitution by his heirs because he subsequently died.
ISSUE: W/N respondent is liable.
RULING: Petition granted. Respondent is liable.
RATIO: We agree with the CA finding that respondent cannot be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the damages suffered by petitioner because respondent is not the employer of the security guards who inflicted the injuries upon the person of the petitioner. However, the Court is not precluded from holding respondent liable under the law for damages resulting from the injuries inflicted on petitioner by the unlawful acts of the security guards
Respondent’s palpable display of bad faith in claiming a superior right to the property over petitioner’s son entitles petitioner to damages resulting therefrom. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries which he sustained, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, the act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.
Respondent violated the principle embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code which mandates that “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” When a right is exercise in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. If mere fault or negligence in one’s act can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable.
*Mia
G.R. No. 157632. December 6, 2006.
Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the RC assailing the decision of the CA
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS: A complaint for damages was filed against the respondent on account of the acts of the security guard employed by him, by shooting the plaintiff resulting in death. Respondent employed security guards to prevent the plaintiff from entering a parcel of land despite knowledge that he did not own the same and that there was a title under the name of the plaintiff’s son. When the latter insisted in entering the land, the guards shoot him. He filed a complaint but there was substitution by his heirs because he subsequently died.
ISSUE: W/N respondent is liable.
RULING: Petition granted. Respondent is liable.
RATIO: We agree with the CA finding that respondent cannot be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the damages suffered by petitioner because respondent is not the employer of the security guards who inflicted the injuries upon the person of the petitioner. However, the Court is not precluded from holding respondent liable under the law for damages resulting from the injuries inflicted on petitioner by the unlawful acts of the security guards
Respondent’s palpable display of bad faith in claiming a superior right to the property over petitioner’s son entitles petitioner to damages resulting therefrom. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries which he sustained, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, the act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.
Respondent violated the principle embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code which mandates that “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” When a right is exercise in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. If mere fault or negligence in one’s act can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable.
*Mia
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
SPS. Chua vs. CA and Co
SPS. ANTONIO CHUA and VIRGINIA CHUA vs. CA and RUFINO CO.
G.R. No. 112660. 14 March 1995.
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the RC of the decision of the CA
Padilla, J.:
Facts: Private respondent Co is the lessee of the 2nd floor of the building located in Binondo, Manila where he conducts his garments manufacturing business. Petitioner spouses, manage a "Jollibee Yumburger" establishment on the ground floor of the same building. Co filed a complaint with Manila City Engineer's Office against the sps based on allegations that the spouses business' on the ground floor obstructed the 2nd floor and created heat and noise therein. In their answer to Co's complaint, the spouses filed a counterclaim for alleged damages resulting from the filing of the complaint.
After hearing, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and ordering Co to pay the spouses actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as atty.’s fees. On appeal by Co, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but deleted the award for damages to petitioners.
Issue: WON there was bad faith or ill-motive on the part of private respondent Co in filing his complaint against petitioners in the trial court which would entitle petitioners to damages
Ruling: CA decision AFFIRMED.
Generally, a complaint for malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal prosecutions, but the term has been expanded to include baseless civil suits filed without a cause of action or probable cause and which are meant to harass or humiliate a defendant.
In the case at bar, the letter complaint of Co was investigated by the Safety Engineers, who reported that the complaint was found to be substantially correct. Accordingly, no malice could be imputed to Co, who merely went to court to seek redress for his perceived grievance, which the City authorities initially acknowledged. The finding that he no longer conducted his business on the second floor of the building cannot be a basis for inferring the presence of bad faith, for it was likewise not refuted that Co still used the leased premises as a store room for his stocks and, besides, findings of bad faith cannot be based on mere inferences unsubstantiated by evidence. Damnum sine injuria esse potest ("There may be an injury inflicted without any act of injustice.")
*Dan'q
G.R. No. 112660. 14 March 1995.
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the RC of the decision of the CA
Padilla, J.:
Facts: Private respondent Co is the lessee of the 2nd floor of the building located in Binondo, Manila where he conducts his garments manufacturing business. Petitioner spouses, manage a "Jollibee Yumburger" establishment on the ground floor of the same building. Co filed a complaint with Manila City Engineer's Office against the sps based on allegations that the spouses business' on the ground floor obstructed the 2nd floor and created heat and noise therein. In their answer to Co's complaint, the spouses filed a counterclaim for alleged damages resulting from the filing of the complaint.
After hearing, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and ordering Co to pay the spouses actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as atty.’s fees. On appeal by Co, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but deleted the award for damages to petitioners.
Issue: WON there was bad faith or ill-motive on the part of private respondent Co in filing his complaint against petitioners in the trial court which would entitle petitioners to damages
Ruling: CA decision AFFIRMED.
Generally, a complaint for malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal prosecutions, but the term has been expanded to include baseless civil suits filed without a cause of action or probable cause and which are meant to harass or humiliate a defendant.
In the case at bar, the letter complaint of Co was investigated by the Safety Engineers, who reported that the complaint was found to be substantially correct. Accordingly, no malice could be imputed to Co, who merely went to court to seek redress for his perceived grievance, which the City authorities initially acknowledged. The finding that he no longer conducted his business on the second floor of the building cannot be a basis for inferring the presence of bad faith, for it was likewise not refuted that Co still used the leased premises as a store room for his stocks and, besides, findings of bad faith cannot be based on mere inferences unsubstantiated by evidence. Damnum sine injuria esse potest ("There may be an injury inflicted without any act of injustice.")
*Dan'q
Quiros and Villegas vs. Arjona et. al.
PROCESO QUIROS and LEONARDA VILLEGAS vs. MARCELO ARJONA, TERESITA BALARBAR, JOSEPHINE ARJONA, and CONCHITA ARJONA
G.R. No. 158901. 9 March 2004.
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
Facts: In Dec 1996, petitioners Proceso Quiros and Leonarda Villegas filed with the office of the barangay captain of Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land located at Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. Petitioners sought to recover from their uncle Marcelo Arjona, one of the respondents herein, their lawful share of the inheritance from their late grandmother Rosa Arjona Quiros alias Doza. In 1997, an amicable settlement was reached between the parties. By reason thereof, respondent Arjona executed a document denominated as "PAKNAAN" ("Agreement", in Pangasinan dialect).
Petitioners filed a complaint with the MCTC with prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution of the compromise agreement which was denied because the subject property cannot be determined with certainty. The RTC reversed the decision of the municipal court on appeal and ordered the issuance of the writ of execution. Respondents appealed to the CA, which reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MCTC.
Issue: WON CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC and reinstating that of the MCTC.
Ruling: Petition denied.
Generally, the rule is that where no repudiation was made during the 10-day period, the amicable settlement attains the status of finality and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to implement and enforce it. However, such rule is not inflexible for it admits of certain exceptions. In the case at bar, the ends of justice would be frustrated if a writ of execution is issued considering the uncertainty of the object of the agreement. To do so would open the possibility of error and future litigations.
Both parties acknowledge that petitioners are entitled to their inheritance, hence, the remedy of nullification, which invalidates the Paknaan, would prejudice petitioners and deprive them of their just share of the inheritance. Respondent cannot, as an afterthought, be allowed to renege on his legal obligation to transfer the property to its rightful heirs. A refusal to reform the Paknaan under such circumstances would have the effect of penalizing one party for negligent conduct, and at the same time permitting the other party to escape the consequences of his negligence and profit thereby. No person shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.
*Dan
G.R. No. 158901. 9 March 2004.
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
Facts: In Dec 1996, petitioners Proceso Quiros and Leonarda Villegas filed with the office of the barangay captain of Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land located at Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. Petitioners sought to recover from their uncle Marcelo Arjona, one of the respondents herein, their lawful share of the inheritance from their late grandmother Rosa Arjona Quiros alias Doza. In 1997, an amicable settlement was reached between the parties. By reason thereof, respondent Arjona executed a document denominated as "PAKNAAN" ("Agreement", in Pangasinan dialect).
Petitioners filed a complaint with the MCTC with prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution of the compromise agreement which was denied because the subject property cannot be determined with certainty. The RTC reversed the decision of the municipal court on appeal and ordered the issuance of the writ of execution. Respondents appealed to the CA, which reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MCTC.
Issue: WON CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC and reinstating that of the MCTC.
Ruling: Petition denied.
Generally, the rule is that where no repudiation was made during the 10-day period, the amicable settlement attains the status of finality and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to implement and enforce it. However, such rule is not inflexible for it admits of certain exceptions. In the case at bar, the ends of justice would be frustrated if a writ of execution is issued considering the uncertainty of the object of the agreement. To do so would open the possibility of error and future litigations.
Both parties acknowledge that petitioners are entitled to their inheritance, hence, the remedy of nullification, which invalidates the Paknaan, would prejudice petitioners and deprive them of their just share of the inheritance. Respondent cannot, as an afterthought, be allowed to renege on his legal obligation to transfer the property to its rightful heirs. A refusal to reform the Paknaan under such circumstances would have the effect of penalizing one party for negligent conduct, and at the same time permitting the other party to escape the consequences of his negligence and profit thereby. No person shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.
*Dan
Theis vs CA
Sps. Theis vs. CA et. al.
G.R. No. 126013. 12 Feb 1997
Petition to review the decision of the CA
Hermosisima, Jr., J.:
Facts: Private respondent Calsons Development Corporation is the owner of three (3) adjacent parcels of land (parcel nos.1, 2 and 3). All three parcels of land are situated in Tagaytay City. Adjacent to parcel no.3 is a vacant lot denominated as parcel no. 4. In 1985, Private respondent constructed a two-srorey house on parcel no. 3 and the two other lots remained idle.
In a survey conducted in 1985, parcel no. 3 was erroneously indicated to be covered by the TCT of parcel no. 1, while the parcel no. 1 and parcel no. 2 were mistakenly surveyed to be located on parcel no. 4 instead. Unaware of the mistake private respondent sold said parcel no. 4 to petitioners.
In 1990, petitioners discovered that parcel no. 4 was owned by another person. They also discovered that the lots actually sold to them were parcel nos. 2 and 3. To remedy the mistake, private respondent offered parcel nos. 1 and 2 as these two were precisely the two vacant lots which private respondent owned and intended to sell. Petitioners rejected the good faith offer. Private respondent made another offer, this time the return of an amount double the price paid by petitioners. Petitioners still refused. Private respondent was then compelled to file an action for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of the properties subject thereof in the RTC which ruled on their favor and on appeal, the CA affirmed the same.
Issue: WON petitioners should be allowed to take parcel no. 3.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed.
The SC held that private respondent obviously committed an honest mistake in selling parcel no. 4. The good faith of the private respondent is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it immediately offered two other vacant lots to the petitioners or to reimburse them with twice the amount paid. That petitioners refused either option left the private respondent with no other choice but to file an action for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of mistake.
To allow the petitioners to take parcel no. 3 would be to countenance unjust enrichment. Considering that petitioners intended at the outset to purchase a vacant lot, their refusal to accept the offer of the private respondent to give them two (2) other vacant lots in exchange, as well as their insistence on parcel no. 3, which is a house and lot, is manifestly unreasonable.
*Dan
G.R. No. 126013. 12 Feb 1997
Petition to review the decision of the CA
Hermosisima, Jr., J.:
Facts: Private respondent Calsons Development Corporation is the owner of three (3) adjacent parcels of land (parcel nos.1, 2 and 3). All three parcels of land are situated in Tagaytay City. Adjacent to parcel no.3 is a vacant lot denominated as parcel no. 4. In 1985, Private respondent constructed a two-srorey house on parcel no. 3 and the two other lots remained idle.
In a survey conducted in 1985, parcel no. 3 was erroneously indicated to be covered by the TCT of parcel no. 1, while the parcel no. 1 and parcel no. 2 were mistakenly surveyed to be located on parcel no. 4 instead. Unaware of the mistake private respondent sold said parcel no. 4 to petitioners.
In 1990, petitioners discovered that parcel no. 4 was owned by another person. They also discovered that the lots actually sold to them were parcel nos. 2 and 3. To remedy the mistake, private respondent offered parcel nos. 1 and 2 as these two were precisely the two vacant lots which private respondent owned and intended to sell. Petitioners rejected the good faith offer. Private respondent made another offer, this time the return of an amount double the price paid by petitioners. Petitioners still refused. Private respondent was then compelled to file an action for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of the properties subject thereof in the RTC which ruled on their favor and on appeal, the CA affirmed the same.
Issue: WON petitioners should be allowed to take parcel no. 3.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed.
The SC held that private respondent obviously committed an honest mistake in selling parcel no. 4. The good faith of the private respondent is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it immediately offered two other vacant lots to the petitioners or to reimburse them with twice the amount paid. That petitioners refused either option left the private respondent with no other choice but to file an action for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of mistake.
To allow the petitioners to take parcel no. 3 would be to countenance unjust enrichment. Considering that petitioners intended at the outset to purchase a vacant lot, their refusal to accept the offer of the private respondent to give them two (2) other vacant lots in exchange, as well as their insistence on parcel no. 3, which is a house and lot, is manifestly unreasonable.
*Dan
Pe et. al vs. Pe
Pe et. al. vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396. 30 May 1962.
Bautista Angelo J.:
Appeal from a decision of the CFI Mla.
Facts: Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brother’s house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.
Issue: W/N the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.”
Held: “The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.”
*Dre
G.R. No. L-17396. 30 May 1962.
Bautista Angelo J.:
Appeal from a decision of the CFI Mla.
Facts: Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brother’s house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.
Issue: W/N the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.”
Held: “The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.”
*Dre
Quimiguing vs. Icao
Quimiguing vs. ICAO
G.R. No. L-26795. 31 July 1970.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte.
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors and had close and confidential relations. Defendant, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with the plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result she became pregnant and had to stop studying. Later she gave birth to a baby girl. She instituted an action to recover damages from the defendant. The lower court dismissed the case on the ground that the original complaint averred no cause of action. Plaintiff appealed.
Issue: W/N defendant is liable for damages.
Held: The orders under appeal are reversed and set aside.
Ratio: “A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of Civil Code of the Philippines: “ ‘Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.’ “
*Dre
G.R. No. L-26795. 31 July 1970.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte.
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors and had close and confidential relations. Defendant, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with the plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result she became pregnant and had to stop studying. Later she gave birth to a baby girl. She instituted an action to recover damages from the defendant. The lower court dismissed the case on the ground that the original complaint averred no cause of action. Plaintiff appealed.
Issue: W/N defendant is liable for damages.
Held: The orders under appeal are reversed and set aside.
Ratio: “A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of Civil Code of the Philippines: “ ‘Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.’ “
*Dre
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