Farrales vs. City Mayor of Baguio, et. al.

LEONOR FARRALES, assisted by her husband, EMILIO FARRALES vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO, THE CHIEF OF POLICE, THE MARKET SUPERINTENDENT AND THE CITY TREASURER
G.R. No. L-24245. 11 April 1972.
Appeal from the decision of the CFI Baguio
Makalintal, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiff was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct a permanent building, Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the permanent building was completed. Instead, Plaintiff built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market without seeking prior permit from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish the shack, Plaintiff sought an injunction before the CFI which asked her that she present proper permit. Upon failure of petitioner to comply with the order, the CFI denied the petition for injunction, and the police then demolished the shack.

ISSUES: (1) WON the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance; (2) WON the police officers are liable for damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance.

RULING: Judgment Affirmed.
(1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to put up the temporary stall in question in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its location on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was such that it constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people.

(2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in only two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary injury; or (b) if an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
In the case at bar, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but through a judicial proceeding. The denial of petitioner’s petition for injunction was in effect an authority for the police to carry out the act which was sought to be enjoined.

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COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks “are adulterated.” As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.

RULING: Petition Denied.
The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach of warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."

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GABETO VS. ARANETA

GABETO VS. ARANETA

FACTS: In 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the bridle. Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other, Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.

ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of the horse by Araneta.

RULING: Judgement reversed and defendant absolved from the complaint.

RATIO: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.

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TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ

TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ

FACTS: The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building. At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The Court of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. CA reversed.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner is liable.

RULING: Decision affirmed.

RATIO: Petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building where the petitioner's vocational school was housed. The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be proximate cause of the injury.

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Salen vs. Balce

SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA vs. JOSE BALCE
G.R. No. L-14414. 27 April 1960.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines Norte.
Bautista Angelo, J.:

Facts: Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then single, 18 yrs old and was living with defendant. As a result of C. Salen's death, G. Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before CFI to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest. Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases. CFI sustained the theory of defendant.

Issue: WON appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with Art. 2180 of the CC.

Ruling: Judgment reversed.
Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the RPC (art.101) is subserved by this particular provision of our CC, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of the SC which cover equal or identical cases.

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Umali vs. Bacani

TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570. 30 January 1976.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan.
Esguerra, J.:

Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.
(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

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Bernardo vs. Legaspi

Bernardo vs. Legaspi
Facts: Plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a collission of plaintiff's automobile and that of the defendant. Defendant filed a cross-complaint against the plaintiff claiming that the collission was due to plaintiff's negligence. The trial court found both drivers negligence.

Issue: WON the plaintiff is negligent in handling his automobile.

Ruling: Complaint Dismissed.

Ratio: Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for the damages suffered.

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Paleyan vs. Bangkili

Paleyan vs. Bangkili
Facts: Carlos Bangkili, 19 yrs. of age killed Balos Paleyan. As a result of the death of Balos Paleyan and of the wounding of another victim, Bangkili was accused of the crime of homocide with less serious physical injuries. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly, but no desicion as to the civil indemnity which should be paid to the heirs of the deceased was made. Plaintiffs filed an action for damages against Carlos Bangkili and his mother, Victoria Bangkili. Complaint was dismissed against Victoria because his son was already 19 yrs. of age at the time he committed the offense. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the mother of Carlos should be liable with him for the amount which he was sentenced to pay considering that he was then a minor of 19 yrs.

Ruling: Victoria Bangkili is liable solidarily with her son.

Ratio: Art. 2180 is aplicable in this case. Considering that her son, although living with her, was already 19 yrs. of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal defense, however, and does not exempt the appellent from her responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Art. 2180 does not provide for any exemption except proof that the defendant parent "observed all the diligence of a god father of a family to prevent damage."

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