JULIAN SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS (Pres. Of BPI)
G.R. No. L-24837. 29 June 1968.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Facts: Appeal by plaintiffs from a decision of the CFI Mla dismissing their complaint against defendants.
On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its president, Freixas, for damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.
After appropriate proceedings, the CFI Mla rendered judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature.
Issue: WON the existence of a contractual relation between the parties bar recovery of damages.
Ruling: The judgment appealed from is reversed holding defendant BPI to pay to the plaintiffs nominal damages, and attorney's fees, apart from the costs.
The SC have repeatedly held that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore.
In view, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake they had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the amount of which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.
*Dani'q
Saturday, November 22, 2008
People vs Ligon
People vs Ligon
Facts: An appeal from te judgment of the RTC convicting accused of the crime of robbery with homicide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales, a 17-year-old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box, and the latter uon clinging to the window of the accused, lost his grip and fell down the pavement as the car sped up. On appeal. The Cort held that it was not convinced with moral certainty of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, hence he was acquitted.
Issue: WON a person feed from criminal liability is also freed from civil liability
Ruling: Accused acquitted but held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault and negligence.
Ratio: It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution, only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action.
On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witness at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, We find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done.
*Mia
Facts: An appeal from te judgment of the RTC convicting accused of the crime of robbery with homicide sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales, a 17-year-old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box, and the latter uon clinging to the window of the accused, lost his grip and fell down the pavement as the car sped up. On appeal. The Cort held that it was not convinced with moral certainty of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, hence he was acquitted.
Issue: WON a person feed from criminal liability is also freed from civil liability
Ruling: Accused acquitted but held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault and negligence.
Ratio: It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal prosecution, only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action.
On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation of the testimonies of both prosecution and defense witness at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, We find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done.
*Mia
Imson vs. Ca
IMSON Vs. CA
Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision involving petitioner's Tuyota Corolla and a hino diesel truck registered under the names of private respondents, FNCB Finance Corp, and Holiday Hills stock and Breeding Farm Corp. The collision seriously injured petitioner and totally wrecked hs car. A complaint for damages was instituted against the registered owners of the truck, the truck driver, the beneficial owners of the truck and the truck insurer, Western Guaranty Corp.In 1987, petitioner and insurer entered into a compromise agreement, hence the complaint was dismissed against the insurer. Later, private respondents moved to dismiss the case against all defendants contending that since they are all indispensable parties, the dismissal of the case against the insurer must result in the dismissal of the suit against all of them.
Issue: WON all of the defendants were indispensable parties.
Ruling: Petition granted.
Ratio: It is true that all of the petitioners' claims are premised on the wrong committed by the defendant truck driver. Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable party to the suit. The other defendants cannot be as indispensable parties, they are merely proper parties to the case.
Thus, if petitioners did not sue Western Guaranty Corp, the omission would not cause the dismissal of the suit against the other defendants. Even without the insurer, the trial court would not lose its competency to act completely and validly on the damage suit.
*Mia
Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision involving petitioner's Tuyota Corolla and a hino diesel truck registered under the names of private respondents, FNCB Finance Corp, and Holiday Hills stock and Breeding Farm Corp. The collision seriously injured petitioner and totally wrecked hs car. A complaint for damages was instituted against the registered owners of the truck, the truck driver, the beneficial owners of the truck and the truck insurer, Western Guaranty Corp.In 1987, petitioner and insurer entered into a compromise agreement, hence the complaint was dismissed against the insurer. Later, private respondents moved to dismiss the case against all defendants contending that since they are all indispensable parties, the dismissal of the case against the insurer must result in the dismissal of the suit against all of them.
Issue: WON all of the defendants were indispensable parties.
Ruling: Petition granted.
Ratio: It is true that all of the petitioners' claims are premised on the wrong committed by the defendant truck driver. Concededly, the truck driver is an indispensable party to the suit. The other defendants cannot be as indispensable parties, they are merely proper parties to the case.
Thus, if petitioners did not sue Western Guaranty Corp, the omission would not cause the dismissal of the suit against the other defendants. Even without the insurer, the trial court would not lose its competency to act completely and validly on the damage suit.
*Mia
Saturday, November 15, 2008
RODZSSEN SUPPLY CO. INC. vs. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO.
RODZSSEN SUPPLY CO. INC. vs. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 109087. 9 May 2001.
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:
Facts: Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January 21, 1993 Decision2 of the CA which affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On January 15, 1979, defendant Rodzssen Supply, Inc. opened with plaintiff Far East Bank and Trust Co. a 30-day domestic letter of credit, in the amount of P190,000.00 in favor of Ekman and Company, Inc. (Ekman) for the purchase from the latter of five units of hydraulic loaders, to expire on February 15, 1979. The three loaders were delivered to defendant for which plaintiff paid Ekman and which defendant paid plaintiff before expiry date of LC. The remaining two loaders were delivered to defendant but the latter refused to pay. Ekman pressed payment to plaintiff. Plaintiff paid Ekman for the two loaders and later demanded from defendant such amount as it paid Ekman. Defendant refused payment contending that there was a breach of contract by plaintiff who in bad faith paid Ekman, knowing that the two units of hydraulic loaders had been delivered to defendant after the expiry date of subject LC.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable to respondent.
Ruling: The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner should pay respondent bank the amount the latter expended for the equipment belatedly delivered by Ekman and voluntarily received and kept by petitioner. Equitable considerations behoove us to allow recovery by respondent. True, it erred in paying Ekman, but petitioner itself was not without fault in the transaction. It must be noted that the latter had voluntarily received and kept the loaders since October 1979. When both parties to a transaction are mutually negligent in the performance of their obligations, the fault of one cancels the negligence of the other and, as in this case, their rights and obligations may be determined equitably under the law proscribing unjust enrichment.
*Daniq*
G.R. No. 109087. 9 May 2001.
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:
Facts: Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January 21, 1993 Decision2 of the CA which affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On January 15, 1979, defendant Rodzssen Supply, Inc. opened with plaintiff Far East Bank and Trust Co. a 30-day domestic letter of credit, in the amount of P190,000.00 in favor of Ekman and Company, Inc. (Ekman) for the purchase from the latter of five units of hydraulic loaders, to expire on February 15, 1979. The three loaders were delivered to defendant for which plaintiff paid Ekman and which defendant paid plaintiff before expiry date of LC. The remaining two loaders were delivered to defendant but the latter refused to pay. Ekman pressed payment to plaintiff. Plaintiff paid Ekman for the two loaders and later demanded from defendant such amount as it paid Ekman. Defendant refused payment contending that there was a breach of contract by plaintiff who in bad faith paid Ekman, knowing that the two units of hydraulic loaders had been delivered to defendant after the expiry date of subject LC.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable to respondent.
Ruling: The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner should pay respondent bank the amount the latter expended for the equipment belatedly delivered by Ekman and voluntarily received and kept by petitioner. Equitable considerations behoove us to allow recovery by respondent. True, it erred in paying Ekman, but petitioner itself was not without fault in the transaction. It must be noted that the latter had voluntarily received and kept the loaders since October 1979. When both parties to a transaction are mutually negligent in the performance of their obligations, the fault of one cancels the negligence of the other and, as in this case, their rights and obligations may be determined equitably under the law proscribing unjust enrichment.
*Daniq*
Friday, November 14, 2008
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY CORPORATION
G.R. No.119771. 24 Apr 1998.
FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)
ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.
RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.
*Jen*
G.R. No.119771. 24 Apr 1998.
FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)
ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.
RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.
*Jen*
RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. and RIDJO PAPER CORP vs. CA et al
RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. and RIDJO PAPER CORP vs. CA et al
GR No 126074. 24 Feb 1998.
Ponente: Romero, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the CA which reversed that of the RTC of Quezon City, ordering petitioners to pay private respondent Manila Electric Co. (MERALCO) the amount of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 plus the costs of suit.
On September 4, 1991 and on July 30, 1992, petitioners received a letter from MERALCO demanding payment of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 , respectively, allegedly representing unregistered electric consumption for the period November 7, 1990, to February 13, 1991 and for the period July 15, 1991 to April 13, 1992. MERALCO justified its demand on the ground that the unregistered electric consumption was due to the defects of the electric meter located in the premises of petitioners. Since petitioners refused to pay the amount, MERALCO notified them that their electricity be disconnected.
ISSUE: WON petitioners should pay the amounts demanded by Meralco despite the defective meter installed by the latter.
RULING: Decision MODIFIED. Petitioners are ordered to pay MERALCO the amount P168,342.75, representing its average electric consumption three months prior to the period in controversy.
It must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence.
The SC concludes that this is a case of negligence on the part of MERALCO for which it must bear the consequences. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute between the parties.
MERALCO, being a public utility vested with vital public interest, is impressed with certain obligations towards its customers and any omission on its part would be prejudicial to its interest. For in the final analysis, the bottom line is that those who do not exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear the consequences of such oversight.
*Daniq*
GR No 126074. 24 Feb 1998.
Ponente: Romero, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the CA which reversed that of the RTC of Quezon City, ordering petitioners to pay private respondent Manila Electric Co. (MERALCO) the amount of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 plus the costs of suit.
On September 4, 1991 and on July 30, 1992, petitioners received a letter from MERALCO demanding payment of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 , respectively, allegedly representing unregistered electric consumption for the period November 7, 1990, to February 13, 1991 and for the period July 15, 1991 to April 13, 1992. MERALCO justified its demand on the ground that the unregistered electric consumption was due to the defects of the electric meter located in the premises of petitioners. Since petitioners refused to pay the amount, MERALCO notified them that their electricity be disconnected.
ISSUE: WON petitioners should pay the amounts demanded by Meralco despite the defective meter installed by the latter.
RULING: Decision MODIFIED. Petitioners are ordered to pay MERALCO the amount P168,342.75, representing its average electric consumption three months prior to the period in controversy.
It must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence.
The SC concludes that this is a case of negligence on the part of MERALCO for which it must bear the consequences. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute between the parties.
MERALCO, being a public utility vested with vital public interest, is impressed with certain obligations towards its customers and any omission on its part would be prejudicial to its interest. For in the final analysis, the bottom line is that those who do not exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear the consequences of such oversight.
*Daniq*
Thursday, November 13, 2008
Espero Salao vs. CA and Jowie Apolonio
Espero Salao vs. CA and Jowie Apolonio G.R. No. 107725. 22 January 1998.
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Facts: This case, which was originated from a complaint for damages filed by private respondent for head injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the petitioner, is a petittion for review on certioraroi of the decision of the CA affirming RTC's decisionwhich ordered petitioner to pay private respondent actual damages, moral damages and atty's fees, as well as the appellate court's resolution denying petitioner's MR.
Petitioner questions the award of damages and atty's fees, providing, as additional ground, the fact that in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats based on the same incident, the MTC found him 'not guilty' and accordingly dismissed the case against him.
Issue: WON the award of damages and atty's fees are appropriate.
Ruling: Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Being a case of physical injuries resulting from a crime or quasi-delict, moral damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court [Art. 2219 (1)(2) NCC].
Additionally, the civil liability for quasi-delict, which is allowed to be brought "separately and independently" of the criminal action by art. 33 NCC, is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not been committed by the accused since it is entirely possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil action may not have been presented in the criminal action with the result that the accused in the latter case may be acquitted.
*Peewee*
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Facts: This case, which was originated from a complaint for damages filed by private respondent for head injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the petitioner, is a petittion for review on certioraroi of the decision of the CA affirming RTC's decisionwhich ordered petitioner to pay private respondent actual damages, moral damages and atty's fees, as well as the appellate court's resolution denying petitioner's MR.
Petitioner questions the award of damages and atty's fees, providing, as additional ground, the fact that in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats based on the same incident, the MTC found him 'not guilty' and accordingly dismissed the case against him.
Issue: WON the award of damages and atty's fees are appropriate.
Ruling: Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Being a case of physical injuries resulting from a crime or quasi-delict, moral damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court [Art. 2219 (1)(2) NCC].
Additionally, the civil liability for quasi-delict, which is allowed to be brought "separately and independently" of the criminal action by art. 33 NCC, is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not been committed by the accused since it is entirely possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil action may not have been presented in the criminal action with the result that the accused in the latter case may be acquitted.
*Peewee*
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
