PONCE VS. LEGASPI
FACTS: Petitioner Ponce and husband Manuel, owned 43% of the stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR). 48% of it was owned by the spouses Porter.The allegations of petitioner states that during the time while respondent Legaspi is the legal counsel of L’NOR, there occurred fraudulent manipulations by spouses Porter and other officers; that with the aid of Legaspi, they incorporated the Yrasport Drydocks, Inc. which was done to compete with L’NOR but still used the office space, equipments and goodwill of L’NOR. On account of flagrant frauds committed by Porter, a charge for estafa was filed where Legaspi appeared as counsel for Porter; that complainant asked Legaspi to take steps to protect L’NOR but the latter refused. Complainant filed for disbarment against Legaspi which was dismissed. Legaspi subsequently filed a complaint for damages against petitioner which was granted by the lower court and affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: W/N the complaint for damages by Legaspi is justified.
RULING: Decision reversed and set aside.
RATIO: While generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits, the foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character and therefore may be the basis for a subsequent action for malicious prosecution. However, malice and want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action. In the case at bar, in the mind of petitioner, the act of the respondent in appearing as counsel for Porter, who had allegedly swindled L'NOR, the interest of which he was duty bound to protect, constituted grave misconduct and gross malpractice. Since the petitioner, however, was of the honest perception that YRASPORT was actually organized to appropriate for itself some of L'NOR's business, then we find that she had probable cause to file the disbarment suit.
Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
*Mia
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Manantan vs CA
MANANTAN VS. CA
FACTS: In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing said automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeep resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.
ISSUE: W/N the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
*Mia
FACTS: In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing said automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeep resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.
ISSUE: W/N the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
*Mia
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
Silahis International Hotel, Inc vs Soluta
G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.
RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x
In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
DECISION: Denied.
*SUGAR
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.
RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x
In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
DECISION: Denied.
*SUGAR
Javellana vs Tayo
G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962
ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
vs.
SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-appellant.
FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the time the acts herein below complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality. The Municipal Council of Buenavista (Council) unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960 which set the regular sessions of the Council and which resolution was duly approved by the respondent. At the time and place set for the regular session of the Council, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who are the petitioners in this case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a temporary presiding officer and a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to do business. On the subsequent Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors and Secretary were still not around. When the Minutes of the Proceeding was presented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution as approved by the Council, the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as null and void and not in accordance with.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid
RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as long as there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. To declare that the proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Public interest will immensely suffer, if a mayor who belongs to one political group refuses to call or attend a session, because the Council is controlled by another political group. (And this was upheld by the SC.)
We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty, not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal an the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session in question.
DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed.
*SUGAR
ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
vs.
SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-appellant.
FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the time the acts herein below complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality. The Municipal Council of Buenavista (Council) unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960 which set the regular sessions of the Council and which resolution was duly approved by the respondent. At the time and place set for the regular session of the Council, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who are the petitioners in this case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a temporary presiding officer and a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to do business. On the subsequent Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors and Secretary were still not around. When the Minutes of the Proceeding was presented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution as approved by the Council, the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as null and void and not in accordance with.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid
RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as long as there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. To declare that the proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Public interest will immensely suffer, if a mayor who belongs to one political group refuses to call or attend a session, because the Council is controlled by another political group. (And this was upheld by the SC.)
We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty, not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal an the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session in question.
DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed.
*SUGAR
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Amaro vs. Sumanguit
CORNELIO AMARO and JOSE AMARO vs. AMBROSIO SUMANGUIT
G.R. No. L-14986 July 31, 1962
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Negros Occidental
Makalintal, J.:
Facts: Appellant Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay; that the following day he, together with his father and his witnesses, went to the office of the defendant chief of police but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized. In view thereof they gave up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime. Amaro filed a complaint against chief of police for damages which motion the court dismissed.
Issue: WON chief of police be held liable for damages under art 27 of the CC
Ruling: ORDER APPEALED from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings.
The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law.
*Dan
G.R. No. L-14986 July 31, 1962
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Negros Occidental
Makalintal, J.:
Facts: Appellant Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot at near the city government building of Silay; that the following day he, together with his father and his witnesses, went to the office of the defendant chief of police but instead of obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and terrorized. In view thereof they gave up and renounced their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime. Amaro filed a complaint against chief of police for damages which motion the court dismissed.
Issue: WON chief of police be held liable for damages under art 27 of the CC
Ruling: ORDER APPEALED from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings.
The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code. That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law.
*Dan
Phil Match Co., Ltd., vs City of Cebu
PHIL. MATCH CO., LTD., vs. CITY OF CEBU & JESUS ZABATE (Acting City Treasurer)
G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Cebu
Aquino, J.:
Facts: Petitioner, engaged in manufacturing of matches, assails the legality of the tax which the city treasure collected on out-of-town deliveries of matches by virtue of the city ordinance which taxes good stored and/or sold within the city. The company sought refund of the sales tax and for damages against the city treasurer fo r not following the advise of the city fiscal, as legal adviser of the city, that all out-of-town deliveries of matches are not subject to sales tax. The trial court dismissed the complaint against the city treasurer.
Issue: WON the city treasurer can be held liable for damages under art. 27 of the CC
Ruling: Judgment AFFIRMED.
Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that "any person suffering material or moral lose because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken." Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In the case at bar, the records clearly show that the city treasurer honestly believed that he was justified under the ordinance to collect taxes. The fiscal’s opinion on the legality of such or any other ordinance is merely advisory and has no binding effects.
As a rule, Where an officer is invested with discretion in matters brought before him and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result or an erroneous or mistaken decision, provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority and without malice, or corruption. It has been held previously by the SC that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages Cabungcal vs. Cordovan 120 Phil. 667).
*Dan
G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Cebu
Aquino, J.:
Facts: Petitioner, engaged in manufacturing of matches, assails the legality of the tax which the city treasure collected on out-of-town deliveries of matches by virtue of the city ordinance which taxes good stored and/or sold within the city. The company sought refund of the sales tax and for damages against the city treasurer fo r not following the advise of the city fiscal, as legal adviser of the city, that all out-of-town deliveries of matches are not subject to sales tax. The trial court dismissed the complaint against the city treasurer.
Issue: WON the city treasurer can be held liable for damages under art. 27 of the CC
Ruling: Judgment AFFIRMED.
Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that "any person suffering material or moral lose because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken." Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or omission of a public official is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In the case at bar, the records clearly show that the city treasurer honestly believed that he was justified under the ordinance to collect taxes. The fiscal’s opinion on the legality of such or any other ordinance is merely advisory and has no binding effects.
As a rule, Where an officer is invested with discretion in matters brought before him and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result or an erroneous or mistaken decision, provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority and without malice, or corruption. It has been held previously by the SC that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages Cabungcal vs. Cordovan 120 Phil. 667).
*Dan
Thursday, January 29, 2009
DE TAVERA VS. PHIL. TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY
DE TAVERA VS. PHIL. TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY
GR. No. L-48928 February 25, 1982
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiff is a doctor of Medicine by profession and a recognized specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis. She is a member of the Board of Directors of the defendant Society, in representation of the PCSO. She was duly appointed as Executive Secretary of the Society. On May 29, 1974, the past Board of Directors removed her summarily from her position, the lawful cause of which she was not informed, through the simple expedient of declaring her position vacant. Defendant Romulo was appointed to the position and defendants Pardo, Nubla, Garcia and Adil, not being members of defendant Society were elevated as members of the Board of Directors. Not being qualified, petitioner alleged said acts to be null and void. The court a quo rendered a decision holding that the present suit being one for quo warranto it should be filed within one year from plaintiff's ouster from office; that nevertheless, plaintiff was not illegally removed from her position as Executive Secretary in The Society since plaintiff was holding an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power and hence temporary.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was illegally removed and thus entitled to damages.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: The action is primarily against the Society and the past members of the Board who are responsible for her removal. Where the respondents, except for Romulo, are not actually holding the office in question, the suit could not be one for quo warranto.
The absence of a fixed term in the letter addressed to petitioner informing her of her appointment as Executive Secretary is very significant. This could have no other implication than that petitioner held an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power.
Petitioner cannot likewise seek relief from the general provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations nor from the fundamental principles of the New Constitution on preservation of human dignity. While these provisions present some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability of social order, these are merely guides for human conduct in the absence of specific legal provisions and definite contractual stipulations. In the case at bar, the Code of By-Laws of the Society contains a specific provision governing the term of office of petitioner. The same necessarily limits her rights under the New Civil Code and the New Constitution upon acceptance of the appointment.
*Mia
GR. No. L-48928 February 25, 1982
GUERRERO, J.:
FACTS: Plaintiff is a doctor of Medicine by profession and a recognized specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis. She is a member of the Board of Directors of the defendant Society, in representation of the PCSO. She was duly appointed as Executive Secretary of the Society. On May 29, 1974, the past Board of Directors removed her summarily from her position, the lawful cause of which she was not informed, through the simple expedient of declaring her position vacant. Defendant Romulo was appointed to the position and defendants Pardo, Nubla, Garcia and Adil, not being members of defendant Society were elevated as members of the Board of Directors. Not being qualified, petitioner alleged said acts to be null and void. The court a quo rendered a decision holding that the present suit being one for quo warranto it should be filed within one year from plaintiff's ouster from office; that nevertheless, plaintiff was not illegally removed from her position as Executive Secretary in The Society since plaintiff was holding an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power and hence temporary.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner was illegally removed and thus entitled to damages.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: The action is primarily against the Society and the past members of the Board who are responsible for her removal. Where the respondents, except for Romulo, are not actually holding the office in question, the suit could not be one for quo warranto.
The absence of a fixed term in the letter addressed to petitioner informing her of her appointment as Executive Secretary is very significant. This could have no other implication than that petitioner held an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing power.
Petitioner cannot likewise seek relief from the general provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations nor from the fundamental principles of the New Constitution on preservation of human dignity. While these provisions present some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability of social order, these are merely guides for human conduct in the absence of specific legal provisions and definite contractual stipulations. In the case at bar, the Code of By-Laws of the Society contains a specific provision governing the term of office of petitioner. The same necessarily limits her rights under the New Civil Code and the New Constitution upon acceptance of the appointment.
*Mia
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