EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., & VEGAFRIA
G.R. NO. 82146 January 22, 1990. (Kinds of Damages)
PETITION for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the RTC
FERNAN, C.J.:
Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas." Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner.
Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
*DAN’Q
Friday, February 13, 2009
VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAÑEDA, JR., ET. AL.
VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAÑEDA, JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218.
Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria.
*DAN’Q
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218.
Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria.
*DAN’Q
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Consunji vs. CA
Facts:
On Nov. 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego´s widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a compalint for damages against the deceased´s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow´s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.
Ruling. The deision of the CA is affirmed.
Ratio:
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private resppondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
*dre
On Nov. 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego´s widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a compalint for damages against the deceased´s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow´s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.
Ruling. The deision of the CA is affirmed.
Ratio:
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private resppondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
*dre
Thursday, February 5, 2009
PONCE VS. LEGASPI
PONCE VS. LEGASPI
FACTS: Petitioner Ponce and husband Manuel, owned 43% of the stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR). 48% of it was owned by the spouses Porter.The allegations of petitioner states that during the time while respondent Legaspi is the legal counsel of L’NOR, there occurred fraudulent manipulations by spouses Porter and other officers; that with the aid of Legaspi, they incorporated the Yrasport Drydocks, Inc. which was done to compete with L’NOR but still used the office space, equipments and goodwill of L’NOR. On account of flagrant frauds committed by Porter, a charge for estafa was filed where Legaspi appeared as counsel for Porter; that complainant asked Legaspi to take steps to protect L’NOR but the latter refused. Complainant filed for disbarment against Legaspi which was dismissed. Legaspi subsequently filed a complaint for damages against petitioner which was granted by the lower court and affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: W/N the complaint for damages by Legaspi is justified.
RULING: Decision reversed and set aside.
RATIO: While generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits, the foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character and therefore may be the basis for a subsequent action for malicious prosecution. However, malice and want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action. In the case at bar, in the mind of petitioner, the act of the respondent in appearing as counsel for Porter, who had allegedly swindled L'NOR, the interest of which he was duty bound to protect, constituted grave misconduct and gross malpractice. Since the petitioner, however, was of the honest perception that YRASPORT was actually organized to appropriate for itself some of L'NOR's business, then we find that she had probable cause to file the disbarment suit.
Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
*Mia
FACTS: Petitioner Ponce and husband Manuel, owned 43% of the stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR). 48% of it was owned by the spouses Porter.The allegations of petitioner states that during the time while respondent Legaspi is the legal counsel of L’NOR, there occurred fraudulent manipulations by spouses Porter and other officers; that with the aid of Legaspi, they incorporated the Yrasport Drydocks, Inc. which was done to compete with L’NOR but still used the office space, equipments and goodwill of L’NOR. On account of flagrant frauds committed by Porter, a charge for estafa was filed where Legaspi appeared as counsel for Porter; that complainant asked Legaspi to take steps to protect L’NOR but the latter refused. Complainant filed for disbarment against Legaspi which was dismissed. Legaspi subsequently filed a complaint for damages against petitioner which was granted by the lower court and affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: W/N the complaint for damages by Legaspi is justified.
RULING: Decision reversed and set aside.
RATIO: While generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits, the foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character and therefore may be the basis for a subsequent action for malicious prosecution. However, malice and want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action. In the case at bar, in the mind of petitioner, the act of the respondent in appearing as counsel for Porter, who had allegedly swindled L'NOR, the interest of which he was duty bound to protect, constituted grave misconduct and gross malpractice. Since the petitioner, however, was of the honest perception that YRASPORT was actually organized to appropriate for itself some of L'NOR's business, then we find that she had probable cause to file the disbarment suit.
Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.
*Mia
Manantan vs CA
MANANTAN VS. CA
FACTS: In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing said automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeep resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.
ISSUE: W/N the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
*Mia
FACTS: In 1982, accused Manantan, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing said automobile to sideswipe a passenger jeep resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile. Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 finding accused intoxicated of alcohol at the time of the accident.
ISSUE: W/N the acquittal extinguished the civil liability.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
RATIO: While the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. The trial court acquitted accused on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
*Mia
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
Silahis International Hotel, Inc vs Soluta
G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.
RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x
In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
DECISION: Denied.
*SUGAR
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.
RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x
In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
DECISION: Denied.
*SUGAR
Javellana vs Tayo
G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962
ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
vs.
SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-appellant.
FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the time the acts herein below complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality. The Municipal Council of Buenavista (Council) unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960 which set the regular sessions of the Council and which resolution was duly approved by the respondent. At the time and place set for the regular session of the Council, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who are the petitioners in this case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a temporary presiding officer and a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to do business. On the subsequent Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors and Secretary were still not around. When the Minutes of the Proceeding was presented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution as approved by the Council, the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as null and void and not in accordance with.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid
RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as long as there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. To declare that the proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Public interest will immensely suffer, if a mayor who belongs to one political group refuses to call or attend a session, because the Council is controlled by another political group. (And this was upheld by the SC.)
We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty, not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal an the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session in question.
DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed.
*SUGAR
ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
vs.
SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-appellant.
FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the time the acts herein below complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality. The Municipal Council of Buenavista (Council) unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960 which set the regular sessions of the Council and which resolution was duly approved by the respondent. At the time and place set for the regular session of the Council, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who are the petitioners in this case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a temporary presiding officer and a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to do business. On the subsequent Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors and Secretary were still not around. When the Minutes of the Proceeding was presented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution as approved by the Council, the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as null and void and not in accordance with.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid
RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as long as there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. To declare that the proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Public interest will immensely suffer, if a mayor who belongs to one political group refuses to call or attend a session, because the Council is controlled by another political group. (And this was upheld by the SC.)
We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty, not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal an the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session in question.
DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed.
*SUGAR
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
