Marcia vs. CA

MARCIA VS. CA
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA
RELOVA, J.:

FACTS: In 1956, a passenger bus in Pampanga operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga. A month later, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by petitioners against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. Paje was convicted by the CFI but was acquitted on appeal ruling that appellant was not even guilty of civil negligence and that it was a pure accident. The CFI of Rizal subsequently dismissed the civil case.

ISSUE: W/N the civil action is an independent one, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

RULING: Decision affirmed.
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
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PAL vs. Miano

Philippine Airlines vs. Florante Miano
G.R. No. 106664 March 8, 1995.
Petition to review the decision of the RTC Makati
Puno, J.:
Facts: On August 31, 1988, private respondent took petitioner's flight bound for Germany. He had an immediate onward connecting flight via Lufthansa flight to Vienna, Austria. At the NAIA, he checked-in one brown suitcase but did not declare a higher valuation. He claimed that his suitcase contained money, documents, one Nikkon camera with zoom lens, etc. Upon private respondent's arrival at Vienna, his checked-in baggage was missing. He reported the matter to the authorities and after three (3) hours of waiting, he proceeded to Piestany, Czechoslovakia. Eleven (11) days after, his suitcase was delivered to him in Piestany. Private respondent instituted an action for damages before the RTC Makati which rendered a decision awarding private respondent moral and exemplary damages and atty’s fees.

Issue: WON the RTC erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages to private respondent.

Ruling: Assailed Decision MODIFIED deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The trial court erred in awarding moral damages to private respondent. The established facts evince that petitioner's late delivery of the baggage for eleven (11) days was not motivated by ill will or bad faith. The SC neither sustained the award of exemplary damages. The prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or quasi-contract is that the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The undisputed facts do not so warrant the characterization of the action of petitioner.
The award of attorney's fees must also be disallowed for lack of legal leg to stand on. Needless to say, award of attorney’s fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.
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ARAFILES VS. PHIL. JOURNALISTS INC., et al.

ARAFILES VS. PHIL. JOURNALISTS INC., et al.

FACTS: About 2 a.m., while respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal Tonight, was at the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. Emelita executed a sworn affidavit which was later on written in the police blotter and perused by Morales. The latter interviewed Emelita. The following day, the article appeared in the headline of respondent’s newspaper which wrote, GOV’T EXEC RAPES COED. About a year following the publication, petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC against respondents for damages. Petitioner alleged that because of the article, his reputation was injured. Respondent answered that his write-up was protected by the constitution on freedom of the press. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.

ISSSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages.

RULING: Petition denied.
In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
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EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., & VEGAFRIA

EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., & VEGAFRIA
G.R. NO. 82146 January 22, 1990. (Kinds of Damages)
PETITION for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the RTC
FERNAN, C.J.:

Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas." Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner.

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.

Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
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VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAÑEDA, JR., ET. AL.

VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAÑEDA, JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:

Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218.

Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.

Ruling: Petition Dismissed.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria.
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Consunji vs. CA

Facts:
On Nov. 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego´s widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a compalint for damages against the deceased´s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow´s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.

Ruling. The deision of the CA is affirmed.

Ratio:
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private resppondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

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PONCE VS. LEGASPI

PONCE VS. LEGASPI

FACTS: Petitioner Ponce and husband Manuel, owned 43% of the stockholdings of L'NOR Marine Services, Inc. (L'NOR). 48% of it was owned by the spouses Porter.The allegations of petitioner states that during the time while respondent Legaspi is the legal counsel of L’NOR, there occurred fraudulent manipulations by spouses Porter and other officers; that with the aid of Legaspi, they incorporated the Yrasport Drydocks, Inc. which was done to compete with L’NOR but still used the office space, equipments and goodwill of L’NOR. On account of flagrant frauds committed by Porter, a charge for estafa was filed where Legaspi appeared as counsel for Porter; that complainant asked Legaspi to take steps to protect L’NOR but the latter refused. Complainant filed for disbarment against Legaspi which was dismissed. Legaspi subsequently filed a complaint for damages against petitioner which was granted by the lower court and affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: W/N the complaint for damages by Legaspi is justified.

RULING: Decision reversed and set aside.

RATIO: While generally, malicious prosecution refers to unfounded criminal actions and has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits, the foundation of an action for malicious prosecution is an original proceeding, judicial in character. A disbarment proceeding is, without doubt, judicial in character and therefore may be the basis for a subsequent action for malicious prosecution. However, malice and want of probable cause must both exist in order to justify the action. In the case at bar, in the mind of petitioner, the act of the respondent in appearing as counsel for Porter, who had allegedly swindled L'NOR, the interest of which he was duty bound to protect, constituted grave misconduct and gross malpractice. Since the petitioner, however, was of the honest perception that YRASPORT was actually organized to appropriate for itself some of L'NOR's business, then we find that she had probable cause to file the disbarment suit.
Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. One who exercises his rights does no injury. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.

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