Marcelo Jervoso and Norma Closa vs People of the Phils. and CA
G.R. No. 89306 September 13, 1990
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
Griño-Aquino, J.:
Facts: RTC of Manila and the CA convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso of homicide for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso; and convicted Marcelo’s wife, Norma Closa, of slight physical injuries committed against the deceased. The RTC imposed the penalty of imprisonment and ordered the petitioners to indemnify the heirs of the deceased R. Jervoso in the amount of P30,000. CA affirmed the order of indemnification.
Issue: WON indemnity may be recovered by the heirs of R. Jervoso despite the reservation by the said heirs of their right to file a separate civil action against the accused.
Ruling: CA decision affirmed, except the award of P30,000 as indemnity for damages which should be deleted.
Sec 1 Rule 111 of the RC states that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the RPC, and damages under Arts 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the CC arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of the said civil actions separately waives the others.
The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide. Having reserved and filed in the RTC Mla a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased R. Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of R. Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the award.
*DAN’Q
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Araos vs. CA
Araos, et. al. vs. CA and Jovan Land, Inc.
G.R. No. 107057 June 2, 1994
Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA’s decision
DAVIDE, J.:
Facts: Petitioners are lessees of a 10-door apartment building which they have been occupying for 25 years. The building was originally owned by Bernardino. After the expiration of the lease contract (31 Jan ’88) between the petitioners and Bernardino, the petitioners, nevertheless occupied their respective units and the lessor continued to collect monthly rentals from the petitioners despite the absence of a written contract. On 11 July 1991, the apartment was sold to Jovan Land, Inc. Three days after, demands to vacate the apartment units were made simultaneously by Bernardino and Jovan Land. When the demands went unheeded, cases for unlawful detainer were files against petitioners before the MeTC Manila. The MeTC ordered defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the increased Rental Arrearages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC. CA reversed RTC and affirmed the MeTC decision.
Issue: WON actual damages include the increased rate in rentals.
Ruling: Petition is partly Granted and CA decision modified by setting aside the increase in rentals fixed therein and ordered petitioners to pay the accumulated rentals until they shall have effectively vacated the leased premises.
There is no basis for the increase in the rentals. The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
*DAN’Q
G.R. No. 107057 June 2, 1994
Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA’s decision
DAVIDE, J.:
Facts: Petitioners are lessees of a 10-door apartment building which they have been occupying for 25 years. The building was originally owned by Bernardino. After the expiration of the lease contract (31 Jan ’88) between the petitioners and Bernardino, the petitioners, nevertheless occupied their respective units and the lessor continued to collect monthly rentals from the petitioners despite the absence of a written contract. On 11 July 1991, the apartment was sold to Jovan Land, Inc. Three days after, demands to vacate the apartment units were made simultaneously by Bernardino and Jovan Land. When the demands went unheeded, cases for unlawful detainer were files against petitioners before the MeTC Manila. The MeTC ordered defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the increased Rental Arrearages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC. CA reversed RTC and affirmed the MeTC decision.
Issue: WON actual damages include the increased rate in rentals.
Ruling: Petition is partly Granted and CA decision modified by setting aside the increase in rentals fixed therein and ordered petitioners to pay the accumulated rentals until they shall have effectively vacated the leased premises.
There is no basis for the increase in the rentals. The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession.
*DAN’Q
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
Marcia vs. CA
MARCIA VS. CA
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA
RELOVA, J.:
FACTS: In 1956, a passenger bus in Pampanga operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga. A month later, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by petitioners against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. Paje was convicted by the CFI but was acquitted on appeal ruling that appellant was not even guilty of civil negligence and that it was a pure accident. The CFI of Rizal subsequently dismissed the civil case.
ISSUE: W/N the civil action is an independent one, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
*Mia
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA
RELOVA, J.:
FACTS: In 1956, a passenger bus in Pampanga operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga. A month later, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by petitioners against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. Paje was convicted by the CFI but was acquitted on appeal ruling that appellant was not even guilty of civil negligence and that it was a pure accident. The CFI of Rizal subsequently dismissed the civil case.
ISSUE: W/N the civil action is an independent one, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
RULING: Decision affirmed.
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
*Mia
Monday, February 16, 2009
PAL vs. Miano
Philippine Airlines vs. Florante Miano
G.R. No. 106664 March 8, 1995.
Petition to review the decision of the RTC Makati
Puno, J.:
Facts: On August 31, 1988, private respondent took petitioner's flight bound for Germany. He had an immediate onward connecting flight via Lufthansa flight to Vienna, Austria. At the NAIA, he checked-in one brown suitcase but did not declare a higher valuation. He claimed that his suitcase contained money, documents, one Nikkon camera with zoom lens, etc. Upon private respondent's arrival at Vienna, his checked-in baggage was missing. He reported the matter to the authorities and after three (3) hours of waiting, he proceeded to Piestany, Czechoslovakia. Eleven (11) days after, his suitcase was delivered to him in Piestany. Private respondent instituted an action for damages before the RTC Makati which rendered a decision awarding private respondent moral and exemplary damages and atty’s fees.
Issue: WON the RTC erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages to private respondent.
Ruling: Assailed Decision MODIFIED deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The trial court erred in awarding moral damages to private respondent. The established facts evince that petitioner's late delivery of the baggage for eleven (11) days was not motivated by ill will or bad faith. The SC neither sustained the award of exemplary damages. The prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or quasi-contract is that the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The undisputed facts do not so warrant the characterization of the action of petitioner.
The award of attorney's fees must also be disallowed for lack of legal leg to stand on. Needless to say, award of attorney’s fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.
*DAN’Q
G.R. No. 106664 March 8, 1995.
Petition to review the decision of the RTC Makati
Puno, J.:
Facts: On August 31, 1988, private respondent took petitioner's flight bound for Germany. He had an immediate onward connecting flight via Lufthansa flight to Vienna, Austria. At the NAIA, he checked-in one brown suitcase but did not declare a higher valuation. He claimed that his suitcase contained money, documents, one Nikkon camera with zoom lens, etc. Upon private respondent's arrival at Vienna, his checked-in baggage was missing. He reported the matter to the authorities and after three (3) hours of waiting, he proceeded to Piestany, Czechoslovakia. Eleven (11) days after, his suitcase was delivered to him in Piestany. Private respondent instituted an action for damages before the RTC Makati which rendered a decision awarding private respondent moral and exemplary damages and atty’s fees.
Issue: WON the RTC erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages to private respondent.
Ruling: Assailed Decision MODIFIED deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In breach of contract of carriage by air, moral damages are awarded only if the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The trial court erred in awarding moral damages to private respondent. The established facts evince that petitioner's late delivery of the baggage for eleven (11) days was not motivated by ill will or bad faith. The SC neither sustained the award of exemplary damages. The prerequisite for the award of exemplary damages in cases of contract or quasi-contract is that the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The undisputed facts do not so warrant the characterization of the action of petitioner.
The award of attorney's fees must also be disallowed for lack of legal leg to stand on. Needless to say, award of attorney’s fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages are eliminated.
*DAN’Q
ARAFILES VS. PHIL. JOURNALISTS INC., et al.
ARAFILES VS. PHIL. JOURNALISTS INC., et al.
FACTS: About 2 a.m., while respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal Tonight, was at the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. Emelita executed a sworn affidavit which was later on written in the police blotter and perused by Morales. The latter interviewed Emelita. The following day, the article appeared in the headline of respondent’s newspaper which wrote, GOV’T EXEC RAPES COED. About a year following the publication, petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC against respondents for damages. Petitioner alleged that because of the article, his reputation was injured. Respondent answered that his write-up was protected by the constitution on freedom of the press. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
ISSSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages.
RULING: Petition denied.
In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
*Mia
FACTS: About 2 a.m., while respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal Tonight, was at the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. Emelita executed a sworn affidavit which was later on written in the police blotter and perused by Morales. The latter interviewed Emelita. The following day, the article appeared in the headline of respondent’s newspaper which wrote, GOV’T EXEC RAPES COED. About a year following the publication, petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC against respondents for damages. Petitioner alleged that because of the article, his reputation was injured. Respondent answered that his write-up was protected by the constitution on freedom of the press. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
ISSSUE: W/N the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages.
RULING: Petition denied.
In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.
*Mia
Friday, February 13, 2009
EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., & VEGAFRIA
EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., & VEGAFRIA
G.R. NO. 82146 January 22, 1990. (Kinds of Damages)
PETITION for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the RTC
FERNAN, C.J.:
Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas." Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner.
Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
*DAN’Q
G.R. NO. 82146 January 22, 1990. (Kinds of Damages)
PETITION for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the RTC
FERNAN, C.J.:
Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas." Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner.
Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
*DAN’Q
VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAÑEDA, JR., ET. AL.
VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAÑEDA, JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218.
Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria.
*DAN’Q
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218.
Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria.
*DAN’Q
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