RODZSSEN SUPPLY CO. INC. vs. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 109087. 9 May 2001.
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:
Facts: Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January 21, 1993 Decision2 of the CA which affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On January 15, 1979, defendant Rodzssen Supply, Inc. opened with plaintiff Far East Bank and Trust Co. a 30-day domestic letter of credit, in the amount of P190,000.00 in favor of Ekman and Company, Inc. (Ekman) for the purchase from the latter of five units of hydraulic loaders, to expire on February 15, 1979. The three loaders were delivered to defendant for which plaintiff paid Ekman and which defendant paid plaintiff before expiry date of LC. The remaining two loaders were delivered to defendant but the latter refused to pay. Ekman pressed payment to plaintiff. Plaintiff paid Ekman for the two loaders and later demanded from defendant such amount as it paid Ekman. Defendant refused payment contending that there was a breach of contract by plaintiff who in bad faith paid Ekman, knowing that the two units of hydraulic loaders had been delivered to defendant after the expiry date of subject LC.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable to respondent.
Ruling: The SC agrees with the CA that petitioner should pay respondent bank the amount the latter expended for the equipment belatedly delivered by Ekman and voluntarily received and kept by petitioner. Equitable considerations behoove us to allow recovery by respondent. True, it erred in paying Ekman, but petitioner itself was not without fault in the transaction. It must be noted that the latter had voluntarily received and kept the loaders since October 1979. When both parties to a transaction are mutually negligent in the performance of their obligations, the fault of one cancels the negligence of the other and, as in this case, their rights and obligations may be determined equitably under the law proscribing unjust enrichment.
*Daniq*
Saturday, November 15, 2008
Friday, November 14, 2008
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY CORPORATION
G.R. No.119771. 24 Apr 1998.
FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)
ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.
RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.
*Jen*
G.R. No.119771. 24 Apr 1998.
FACTS: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.
About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)
ISSUEs: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?
2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case?
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED.
RATIO: Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law - i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta"
Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.
*Jen*
RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. and RIDJO PAPER CORP vs. CA et al
RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. and RIDJO PAPER CORP vs. CA et al
GR No 126074. 24 Feb 1998.
Ponente: Romero, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the CA which reversed that of the RTC of Quezon City, ordering petitioners to pay private respondent Manila Electric Co. (MERALCO) the amount of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 plus the costs of suit.
On September 4, 1991 and on July 30, 1992, petitioners received a letter from MERALCO demanding payment of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 , respectively, allegedly representing unregistered electric consumption for the period November 7, 1990, to February 13, 1991 and for the period July 15, 1991 to April 13, 1992. MERALCO justified its demand on the ground that the unregistered electric consumption was due to the defects of the electric meter located in the premises of petitioners. Since petitioners refused to pay the amount, MERALCO notified them that their electricity be disconnected.
ISSUE: WON petitioners should pay the amounts demanded by Meralco despite the defective meter installed by the latter.
RULING: Decision MODIFIED. Petitioners are ordered to pay MERALCO the amount P168,342.75, representing its average electric consumption three months prior to the period in controversy.
It must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence.
The SC concludes that this is a case of negligence on the part of MERALCO for which it must bear the consequences. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute between the parties.
MERALCO, being a public utility vested with vital public interest, is impressed with certain obligations towards its customers and any omission on its part would be prejudicial to its interest. For in the final analysis, the bottom line is that those who do not exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear the consequences of such oversight.
*Daniq*
GR No 126074. 24 Feb 1998.
Ponente: Romero, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of the CA which reversed that of the RTC of Quezon City, ordering petitioners to pay private respondent Manila Electric Co. (MERALCO) the amount of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 plus the costs of suit.
On September 4, 1991 and on July 30, 1992, petitioners received a letter from MERALCO demanding payment of P415,317.66 and P89,710.58 , respectively, allegedly representing unregistered electric consumption for the period November 7, 1990, to February 13, 1991 and for the period July 15, 1991 to April 13, 1992. MERALCO justified its demand on the ground that the unregistered electric consumption was due to the defects of the electric meter located in the premises of petitioners. Since petitioners refused to pay the amount, MERALCO notified them that their electricity be disconnected.
ISSUE: WON petitioners should pay the amounts demanded by Meralco despite the defective meter installed by the latter.
RULING: Decision MODIFIED. Petitioners are ordered to pay MERALCO the amount P168,342.75, representing its average electric consumption three months prior to the period in controversy.
It must be underscored that MERALCO has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence.
The SC concludes that this is a case of negligence on the part of MERALCO for which it must bear the consequences. Its failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute between the parties.
MERALCO, being a public utility vested with vital public interest, is impressed with certain obligations towards its customers and any omission on its part would be prejudicial to its interest. For in the final analysis, the bottom line is that those who do not exercise such prudence in the discharge of their duties shall be made to bear the consequences of such oversight.
*Daniq*
Thursday, November 13, 2008
Espero Salao vs. CA and Jowie Apolonio
Espero Salao vs. CA and Jowie Apolonio G.R. No. 107725. 22 January 1998.
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Facts: This case, which was originated from a complaint for damages filed by private respondent for head injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the petitioner, is a petittion for review on certioraroi of the decision of the CA affirming RTC's decisionwhich ordered petitioner to pay private respondent actual damages, moral damages and atty's fees, as well as the appellate court's resolution denying petitioner's MR.
Petitioner questions the award of damages and atty's fees, providing, as additional ground, the fact that in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats based on the same incident, the MTC found him 'not guilty' and accordingly dismissed the case against him.
Issue: WON the award of damages and atty's fees are appropriate.
Ruling: Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Being a case of physical injuries resulting from a crime or quasi-delict, moral damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court [Art. 2219 (1)(2) NCC].
Additionally, the civil liability for quasi-delict, which is allowed to be brought "separately and independently" of the criminal action by art. 33 NCC, is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not been committed by the accused since it is entirely possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil action may not have been presented in the criminal action with the result that the accused in the latter case may be acquitted.
*Peewee*
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Facts: This case, which was originated from a complaint for damages filed by private respondent for head injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the petitioner, is a petittion for review on certioraroi of the decision of the CA affirming RTC's decisionwhich ordered petitioner to pay private respondent actual damages, moral damages and atty's fees, as well as the appellate court's resolution denying petitioner's MR.
Petitioner questions the award of damages and atty's fees, providing, as additional ground, the fact that in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats based on the same incident, the MTC found him 'not guilty' and accordingly dismissed the case against him.
Issue: WON the award of damages and atty's fees are appropriate.
Ruling: Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Being a case of physical injuries resulting from a crime or quasi-delict, moral damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court [Art. 2219 (1)(2) NCC].
Additionally, the civil liability for quasi-delict, which is allowed to be brought "separately and independently" of the criminal action by art. 33 NCC, is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not been committed by the accused since it is entirely possible that all the witnesses presented in the civil action may not have been presented in the criminal action with the result that the accused in the latter case may be acquitted.
*Peewee*
Gan vs CA
Hedy Gan y Yu vs CA
No. L-44264. 19 Sept 1988.
Ponente: Fernan, C.J.:
Facts: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles parked on one side of the road, one following the other. As the car driven by Gan approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit an old man who was about to cross the street, pinning him against the rear of one of the parked vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the other parked vehicle in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.
Issue: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple imprudence.
Ruling: SC reversed CA's decision, acquitting petitioner.
Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence resulting in Homicide.
*Daniq*
No. L-44264. 19 Sept 1988.
Ponente: Fernan, C.J.:
Facts: In the morning of 4 July 1972, the accused Hedy Gan was driving along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. There were two vehicles parked on one side of the road, one following the other. As the car driven by Gan approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake the one in front of it thereby encroaching the lane of the car driven by Gan. To avoid a head-on collision, Gan swerved to the right and as a consequence, hit an old man who was about to cross the street, pinning him against the rear of one of the parked vehicles. The force of the impact caused the parked vehicle to move forward hitting the other parked vehicle in front of it. The pedestrian was injured, Gan's car and the two parked vehicle suffered damages. The pedestrian was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
Gan was convicted of Homicide thru reckless imprudence. On appeal, CA modified the trial court's decision convicting Gan of Homicide thru simple imprudence.
Issue: WON CA erred in convicting petitioner Gan for Homicide thru simple imprudence.
Ruling: SC reversed CA's decision, acquitting petitioner.
Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly fonds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act w/o tme to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.
Applying the above test to the case at bar, the SC finds the petitioner not guilty of the crime of simple imprudence resulting in Homicide.
*Daniq*
Thermochem Inc. vs. Naval
Thermochem Inc. vs. Naval. Gr. No.131541. 20 Oct 2000
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago
Facts: On May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem was driving a "Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig, going towards Cainta. Prior to the collision, the taxicab was parked along the right side of Ortigas Avenue, not far from the Rosario Bridge, to unload a passenger. Thereafter, the driver executed a U-turn to traverse the same road, going to the direction of EDSA. At this point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta collided with the taxicab. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage to the said tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result of the incident. Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner, Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent actual, compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Issue: Whether or not Castro was Negligent.
Ruling: Decision modified. Award is reduced in half, considering the contributory negligence of the driver of private respondent's taxi.
The Supreme Court held that the driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the driver of the U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the fact that a party had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and this should not relieve him of liability. The driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U-turns are not generally advisable particularly on major streets. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had not yet fully made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi ought to have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill slope. Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part, making him contributorily liable. Most public utility drivers disregard signs and traffic rules especially during the night when traffic enforcers manning the streets disappear with the light. In driving vehicles, the primary concern should be the safety not only of the driver or his passengers, but also his fellow motorists.
Lucia Europa v Hunter Garments manufacturing (PHIL) Inc.
LUCIA EUROPA VS HUNTER GARMENTS MFG. PHIL. INC. (HUNTER)
G.R. No. 72827. 18 July 1989.
Ponente: Paras, J.:
Facts: In 1973, petitioner’s daughter, Lucrecia Europa, was employed as sample maker by the private respondent (Hunter). Sometime in the course of her employment, Lucrecia got electrocuted by the high speed sewing machine which was assigned to her by Hunter.
On 18 July 1980, petitioner filed an action for damages against Hunter based on quasi-delict. The Lower Court (LC) found for petitioner.
Issue: WON there was gross negligence on the part of private respondent as expressed in the judgment of the LC.
Ruling: Yes. Indemnity for death increased to P30,000.
The SC held that in actions based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, all damages for natural and probable consequences of the act/omission complained of are recoverable (Art. 2202 NCC).
As found by the LC, there were at least two incidents where high speed sewing machines of defendant corporation were grounded. These were brought to the attention of the management of Hunter but nothing was done. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Salvador confirmed that Lucrecia died from “shock probably secondary to electrocution.” The SC reiterated the LC and held that if the machines were frequently and regularly checked or properly maintained, the death of Lucrecia could not have come to pass.
*Daniq*
G.R. No. 72827. 18 July 1989.
Ponente: Paras, J.:
Facts: In 1973, petitioner’s daughter, Lucrecia Europa, was employed as sample maker by the private respondent (Hunter). Sometime in the course of her employment, Lucrecia got electrocuted by the high speed sewing machine which was assigned to her by Hunter.
On 18 July 1980, petitioner filed an action for damages against Hunter based on quasi-delict. The Lower Court (LC) found for petitioner.
Issue: WON there was gross negligence on the part of private respondent as expressed in the judgment of the LC.
Ruling: Yes. Indemnity for death increased to P30,000.
The SC held that in actions based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, all damages for natural and probable consequences of the act/omission complained of are recoverable (Art. 2202 NCC).
As found by the LC, there were at least two incidents where high speed sewing machines of defendant corporation were grounded. These were brought to the attention of the management of Hunter but nothing was done. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Salvador confirmed that Lucrecia died from “shock probably secondary to electrocution.” The SC reiterated the LC and held that if the machines were frequently and regularly checked or properly maintained, the death of Lucrecia could not have come to pass.
*Daniq*
Mandarin Villa, Inc. vs. CA and Clodualdo de Jesus
Mandarin Villa, Inc. vs. CA and Clodualdo de Jesus
G.R. No. 119850. 20 June 1996.
Ponente: Franciso, J.:
Facts: In the evening of 19 Oct 1989, private respondent de Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends at the peririoner’s restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village in Mandaluyong City. After dinner, the waiter handed to de Jesus the bill amounting to P2,658.50. De Jesus offered his BANKARD credit card to the waiter for payment. Minutes later, the waiter returned and audibly informed that said credit card had expired. De Jesus demonstrated that the card had yet to expire on Sept 1990, as embossed on its face. De Jesus approached the cashier who again dishonored such card. De Jesus offered his BPI express credit card instead and this was accepted, honored and verified. The trial court and CA held petitioner to be negligent.
Issues: WON petitioner was negligent; If negligent, WON such negligence was the proximate cause of private respondent’s damage.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. In the case at bar, the Point of Sale Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow under the circumstances reveals that whenever the words CARD EXPIRED flashes on screen, petitioner should check card’s expiry date as embossed in the card itself. If unexpired, petitioner should honor the card. Clearly, it has not yet expired in 19 Oct 1989 when the same was dishonored by petitioner. Hence, petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation and as such, petitioner is guilty of negligence.
The humiliation and embarrassment of private respondent was brought about by the fact of dishonor by petitioner of private respondent’s valid BANKARD. Hence, petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of private respondent’s damage.
*Daniq*
G.R. No. 119850. 20 June 1996.
Ponente: Franciso, J.:
Facts: In the evening of 19 Oct 1989, private respondent de Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends at the peririoner’s restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village in Mandaluyong City. After dinner, the waiter handed to de Jesus the bill amounting to P2,658.50. De Jesus offered his BANKARD credit card to the waiter for payment. Minutes later, the waiter returned and audibly informed that said credit card had expired. De Jesus demonstrated that the card had yet to expire on Sept 1990, as embossed on its face. De Jesus approached the cashier who again dishonored such card. De Jesus offered his BPI express credit card instead and this was accepted, honored and verified. The trial court and CA held petitioner to be negligent.
Issues: WON petitioner was negligent; If negligent, WON such negligence was the proximate cause of private respondent’s damage.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. In the case at bar, the Point of Sale Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow under the circumstances reveals that whenever the words CARD EXPIRED flashes on screen, petitioner should check card’s expiry date as embossed in the card itself. If unexpired, petitioner should honor the card. Clearly, it has not yet expired in 19 Oct 1989 when the same was dishonored by petitioner. Hence, petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation and as such, petitioner is guilty of negligence.
The humiliation and embarrassment of private respondent was brought about by the fact of dishonor by petitioner of private respondent’s valid BANKARD. Hence, petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of private respondent’s damage.
*Daniq*
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