LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21486. 14 May 1966.
Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA which affirmed that rendered by the CFI Bulacan
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Facts: The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner's bus, on which she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded. The court a quo sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, to pay to plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and moral damages; and counsel fees. CA affirmed.
Issues: (1) WON the petitioners are liable for the consequences of the accident. (2) WON petitioners are liable for moral damages.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for negligence. Both the CFI and the CA found that the bus was running quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new, petitioner describes it as "hindi masyadong kalbo," or not so very worn out, the plea of caso fortuito by petitioner cannot be entertained. The cause of the blow-out was a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough check-up before it took to the road. Hence, petitioners are liable for the accident.
(2) The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
*Dani'q
Monday, December 1, 2008
Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.
Teodora Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.
G.R. No. L-33380. 17 December 1930.
Malcolm, J.:
Facts: In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the defendant, Manila Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue: WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render it liable for damages.
Ruling: The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
In the case at ber, the cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.
*Dani'q
G.R. No. L-33380. 17 December 1930.
Malcolm, J.:
Facts: In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the defendant, Manila Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue: WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render it liable for damages.
Ruling: The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be.
In the case at ber, the cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.
*Dani'q
Gregorio, et. al. vs. Go Chong Bing
Honoria Vda. de Gregorio, et. al. vs, Go Chong Bing
No. L-7763. 2 December 1957
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI Davao
Labrador, J.:
Facts: Defendant, owner of trucks, had a driver and a "cargador" by the name of Francisco Romera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952, defendant ordered Romera to drive his tuck with instructions that he follow another truck which was to be driven by the defendant's driver. On its way, some persons boarded the truck, one of them was a uniformed polceman by the name of Venana Orfanel. After a while, Orfanel asked and insisted on driving the truck. Romera, out of respect and belief that Orfanel knew how to drive well, allowed Orfanel to take the wheel. While Orfanel was driving, they came to a truck that was about to park on the left side of the road. To avoid collision, Orfanel swerved to the right and hit two pedestrians and ran over one of them named Quirico Gregorio. Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. The heirs of Gregorio brought present case for damages against the defendant, owner of the truck that ran over Gregorio. The CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the death of Gregorio was caused by a negligent act/omission of a person that is not, in any way, related to the defendant.
Issue: WON defendant may be held liable for damages.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
Where the death/accident is brought by an act/omission of a person who is not, in any way, related to the defendant, and the said act is the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of the victim, or accident which is punishable by law, defendant should be absolved from any civil liability.
The reason is not because the one responsible for the accident had already indemnified the victim but because there is no direct, causal connection between the negligence/violation of law by the defendant to the death of the victim.
*Dan'q
No. L-7763. 2 December 1957
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI Davao
Labrador, J.:
Facts: Defendant, owner of trucks, had a driver and a "cargador" by the name of Francisco Romera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952, defendant ordered Romera to drive his tuck with instructions that he follow another truck which was to be driven by the defendant's driver. On its way, some persons boarded the truck, one of them was a uniformed polceman by the name of Venana Orfanel. After a while, Orfanel asked and insisted on driving the truck. Romera, out of respect and belief that Orfanel knew how to drive well, allowed Orfanel to take the wheel. While Orfanel was driving, they came to a truck that was about to park on the left side of the road. To avoid collision, Orfanel swerved to the right and hit two pedestrians and ran over one of them named Quirico Gregorio. Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. The heirs of Gregorio brought present case for damages against the defendant, owner of the truck that ran over Gregorio. The CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the death of Gregorio was caused by a negligent act/omission of a person that is not, in any way, related to the defendant.
Issue: WON defendant may be held liable for damages.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
Where the death/accident is brought by an act/omission of a person who is not, in any way, related to the defendant, and the said act is the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of the victim, or accident which is punishable by law, defendant should be absolved from any civil liability.
The reason is not because the one responsible for the accident had already indemnified the victim but because there is no direct, causal connection between the negligence/violation of law by the defendant to the death of the victim.
*Dan'q
Sunday, November 30, 2008
Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District
MR. & MRS. ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT (gov’t-owned corp.)
No. L-7664. 29 August 1958.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Rizal QC
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.
Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and towing line. Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool use. In that, it appears that defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury to or even death of its patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has went to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause of his death.
*Dani'q
No. L-7664. 29 August 1958.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Rizal QC
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.
Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and towing line. Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool use. In that, it appears that defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury to or even death of its patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has went to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause of his death.
*Dani'q
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.
Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occassion.
*Dre
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.
Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occassion.
*Dre
CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.
CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.
Facts: Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s siren. Plaintiff´s husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband.
Issue: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.
Ruling: Complaint Dismissed
Ratio: ¨ A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the apperance of a train, is guilty of crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results.¨ The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was not allowed to recover.
*Dre
Facts: Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s siren. Plaintiff´s husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband.
Issue: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.
Ruling: Complaint Dismissed
Ratio: ¨ A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the apperance of a train, is guilty of crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results.¨ The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was not allowed to recover.
*Dre
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