Honoria Vda. de Gregorio, et. al. vs, Go Chong Bing
No. L-7763. 2 December 1957
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI Davao
Labrador, J.:
Facts: Defendant, owner of trucks, had a driver and a "cargador" by the name of Francisco Romera. In the afternoon of June 2, 1952, defendant ordered Romera to drive his tuck with instructions that he follow another truck which was to be driven by the defendant's driver. On its way, some persons boarded the truck, one of them was a uniformed polceman by the name of Venana Orfanel. After a while, Orfanel asked and insisted on driving the truck. Romera, out of respect and belief that Orfanel knew how to drive well, allowed Orfanel to take the wheel. While Orfanel was driving, they came to a truck that was about to park on the left side of the road. To avoid collision, Orfanel swerved to the right and hit two pedestrians and ran over one of them named Quirico Gregorio. Orfanel was prosecuted for homicide with reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. The heirs of Gregorio brought present case for damages against the defendant, owner of the truck that ran over Gregorio. The CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the death of Gregorio was caused by a negligent act/omission of a person that is not, in any way, related to the defendant.
Issue: WON defendant may be held liable for damages.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
Where the death/accident is brought by an act/omission of a person who is not, in any way, related to the defendant, and the said act is the proximate, immediate and direct cause of the death of the victim, or accident which is punishable by law, defendant should be absolved from any civil liability.
The reason is not because the one responsible for the accident had already indemnified the victim but because there is no direct, causal connection between the negligence/violation of law by the defendant to the death of the victim.
*Dan'q
Monday, December 1, 2008
Sunday, November 30, 2008
Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District
MR. & MRS. ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT (gov’t-owned corp.)
No. L-7664. 29 August 1958.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Rizal QC
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.
Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and towing line. Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool use. In that, it appears that defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury to or even death of its patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has went to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause of his death.
*Dani'q
No. L-7664. 29 August 1958.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Rizal QC
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable.
Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed.
(1) The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and towing line. Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool use. In that, it appears that defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury to or even death of its patrons.
(2) The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has went to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate and only cause of his death.
*Dani'q
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.
Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occassion.
*Dre
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in-law. Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.
Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occassion.
*Dre
CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.
CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.
Facts: Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s siren. Plaintiff´s husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband.
Issue: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.
Ruling: Complaint Dismissed
Ratio: ¨ A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the apperance of a train, is guilty of crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results.¨ The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was not allowed to recover.
*Dre
Facts: Plaintiff´s husband was driving a jeep close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balobago, Angeles, Pampanga on February 21, 1957. Defendant´s train was passing by and blew it´s siren. Plaintiff´s husband slowed down his jeep but did not make a full stop. The jeep collided with the locomotive engine of the train. Plaintiff´s husband was injured and died asa a result of such injuries. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for the death of her husband.
Issue: WON the plaintiff can recover damages.
Ruling: Complaint Dismissed
Ratio: ¨ A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the apperance of a train, is guilty of crominal negligence, providing a collission occurs and injury results.¨ The accident was caused by the negligence of plaintiff´s husband and she was not allowed to recover.
*Dre
Wednesday, November 26, 2008
LBC Air Cargo, Inc., et. al. vs. CA
LBC Air Cargo, Inc., et. al. vs. CA
G.R. No. 101683. 23 February 1995.
Petition for review of a decision of the CA reversing that of the RTC and holding LBC and Tano liable.
Vitug, J.:
Facts: At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its way to Bislig Airport. When Tano was approaching the airport entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting Tano started to make a sharp left turn and when he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the LBC van. Monterola died.
Issue:WON the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause of the accident.
Ruling: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner Tano, who, despite poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for the dust to settle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant case, the victim was travelling along the lane where he was rightl supposd to be. The incident occured in an instant. No apreciable time had elapsed that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. However, the deceased was contributorily negligent in evidently speeding.
The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory negligence on the victim's part that warrants a mitigation of petitioner's liability for damages.
*Dan'q
G.R. No. 101683. 23 February 1995.
Petition for review of a decision of the CA reversing that of the RTC and holding LBC and Tano liable.
Vitug, J.:
Facts: At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of LBC, driven by petitioner herein, Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its way to Bislig Airport. When Tano was approaching the airport entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and waited for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting Tano started to make a sharp left turn and when he was about to reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the LBC van. Monterola died.
Issue:WON the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause of the accident.
Ruling: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner Tano, who, despite poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for the dust to settle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant case, the victim was travelling along the lane where he was rightl supposd to be. The incident occured in an instant. No apreciable time had elapsed that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. However, the deceased was contributorily negligent in evidently speeding.
The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory negligence on the victim's part that warrants a mitigation of petitioner's liability for damages.
*Dan'q
PLDT vs. CA
Facts: On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban had their jeep ran over a sand of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of warning light or signs. Respondent spouses suffered physical injuries and their jeeps windshield was shattered. PLDT alleged that the respondents were negligent and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Company which undertook said conduit system to be the one liable.The latter claimed to have complied with its contract and had installed necessary barricades.
Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
Ruling: Private Respondent´s negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident, hence he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT considering that he had ¨the last clear chance¨, to avoid the injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
*Dre
Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
Ruling: Private Respondent´s negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident, hence he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT considering that he had ¨the last clear chance¨, to avoid the injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
*Dre
NAPOCOR vs. CA
Facts: On Nov. 4, 1967, a typhoon called ¨Welming¨ hit Central Luzon passing through NAPOCOR´s Angat Hydro-Electric Project Dam in Bulacan. The water level had reach the danger height of 212 meters above sea level and abruptly opened the spillway gates. This action by NAPOCOR had an extraordinary large volume of water rushed and hit the installations and construction works of ECI (Engineering Construction, Inc.) a contractor of NAWASA for its tunnel in Bulacan. The negligent manner of opening the spillway gates by NAPOCOR had washed away, lost or destroyed ECI´s facilities and structures. NAPOCOR alleged that the destruction and loss was due to force majeure.
Issue: WON NAPOCOR is liable for the destruction.
Ruling: Petition Dismissed
Ratio: NAPOCOR cannot escape liability because it´s negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and damage even though the typhoon was an act of God. It was undoubtly negligent when it only opened the spillway gates at the height of typhoon ¨Welming¨ when it knew very well that it was safer to open it gradually. To be exempt from liability, NAPOCOR must be free from any previous negligence.
*Dre
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